freebsd-src/sys/kern/vfs_extattr.c

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1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)vfs_syscalls.c 8.13 (Berkeley) 4/15/94
1999-08-28 02:08:13 +01:00
* $FreeBSD$
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*/
/* For 4.3 integer FS ID compatibility */
#include "opt_compat.h"
#include "opt_mac.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/bio.h>
#include <sys/buf.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
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#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/linker.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/unistd.h>
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#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/dirent.h>
#include <sys/extattr.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <machine/limits.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
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#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/vm_object.h>
#include <vm/vm_page.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
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2002-03-19 21:25:46 +00:00
static int change_dir(struct nameidata *ndp, struct thread *td);
static int chroot_refuse_vdir_fds(struct filedesc *fdp);
static int getutimes(const struct timeval *, struct timespec *);
static int setfown(struct thread *td, struct vnode *, uid_t, gid_t);
static int setfmode(struct thread *td, struct vnode *, int);
static int setfflags(struct thread *td, struct vnode *, int);
static int setutimes(struct thread *td, struct vnode *,
const struct timespec *, int, int);
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static int vn_access(struct vnode *vp, int user_flags, struct ucred *cred,
struct thread *td);
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int (*union_dircheckp)(struct thread *td, struct vnode **, struct file *);
int (*softdep_fsync_hook)(struct vnode *);
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/*
* Sync each mounted filesystem.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct sync_args {
int dummy;
};
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG
static int syncprt = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_debug, OID_AUTO, syncprt, CTLFLAG_RW, &syncprt, 0, "");
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
sync(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
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struct sync_args *uap;
{
struct mount *mp, *nmp;
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int asyncflag;
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
if (vfs_busy(mp, LK_NOWAIT, &mountlist_mtx, td)) {
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
continue;
}
if ((mp->mnt_flag & MNT_RDONLY) == 0 &&
vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_NOWAIT) == 0) {
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asyncflag = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_ASYNC;
mp->mnt_flag &= ~MNT_ASYNC;
vfs_msync(mp, MNT_NOWAIT);
VFS_SYNC(mp, MNT_NOWAIT,
((td != NULL) ? td->td_ucred : NOCRED), td);
mp->mnt_flag |= asyncflag;
vn_finished_write(mp);
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}
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
vfs_unbusy(mp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
#if 0
/*
* XXX don't call vfs_bufstats() yet because that routine
* was not imported in the Lite2 merge.
*/
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
if (syncprt)
vfs_bufstats();
#endif /* DIAGNOSTIC */
#endif
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return (0);
}
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 12:38:52 +01:00
/* XXX PRISON: could be per prison flag */
static int prison_quotas;
#if 0
SYSCTL_INT(_kern_prison, OID_AUTO, quotas, CTLFLAG_RW, &prison_quotas, 0, "");
#endif
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/*
* Change filesystem quotas.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct quotactl_args {
char *path;
int cmd;
int uid;
caddr_t arg;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
quotactl(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct quotactl_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) cmd;
syscallarg(int) uid;
syscallarg(caddr_t) arg;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct mount *mp;
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int error;
struct nameidata nd;
if (jailed(td->td_ucred) && !prison_quotas)
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 12:38:52 +01:00
return (EPERM);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
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vrele(nd.ni_vp);
if (error)
return (error);
error = VFS_QUOTACTL(mp, SCARG(uap, cmd), SCARG(uap, uid),
SCARG(uap, arg), td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return (error);
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}
/*
* Get filesystem statistics.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct statfs_args {
char *path;
struct statfs *buf;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
statfs(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct statfs_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct statfs *) buf;
} */ *uap;
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{
register struct mount *mp;
register struct statfs *sp;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
struct statfs sb;
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NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
mp = nd.ni_vp->v_mount;
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
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vrele(nd.ni_vp);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_mount_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp, td);
if (error)
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return (error);
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
if (suser(td)) {
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
sp = &sb;
}
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return (copyout(sp, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sp)));
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}
/*
* Get filesystem statistics.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct fstatfs_args {
int fd;
struct statfs *buf;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
fstatfs(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct fstatfs_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(struct statfs *) buf;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct file *fp;
struct mount *mp;
register struct statfs *sp;
int error;
struct statfs sb;
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if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
mp = ((struct vnode *)fp->f_data)->v_mount;
fdrop(fp, td);
if (mp == NULL)
return (EBADF);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_mount_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
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sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp, td);
if (error)
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return (error);
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
if (suser(td)) {
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
sp = &sb;
}
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
return (copyout(sp, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sp)));
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}
/*
* Get statistics on all filesystems.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct getfsstat_args {
struct statfs *buf;
long bufsize;
int flags;
};
#endif
int
getfsstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct getfsstat_args /* {
syscallarg(struct statfs *) buf;
syscallarg(long) bufsize;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct mount *mp, *nmp;
register struct statfs *sp;
caddr_t sfsp;
long count, maxcount, error;
maxcount = SCARG(uap, bufsize) / sizeof(struct statfs);
sfsp = (caddr_t)SCARG(uap, buf);
count = 0;
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
for (mp = TAILQ_FIRST(&mountlist); mp != NULL; mp = nmp) {
#ifdef MAC
if (mac_check_mount_stat(td->td_ucred, mp) != 0) {
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
continue;
}
#endif
if (vfs_busy(mp, LK_NOWAIT, &mountlist_mtx, td)) {
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
continue;
}
if (sfsp && count < maxcount) {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
/*
* If MNT_NOWAIT or MNT_LAZY is specified, do not
* refresh the fsstat cache. MNT_NOWAIT or MNT_LAZY
* overrides MNT_WAIT.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
if (((SCARG(uap, flags) & (MNT_LAZY|MNT_NOWAIT)) == 0 ||
(SCARG(uap, flags) & MNT_WAIT)) &&
(error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp, td))) {
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
vfs_unbusy(mp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
continue;
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(sp, sfsp, sizeof(*sp));
if (error) {
vfs_unbusy(mp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
sfsp += sizeof(*sp);
}
count++;
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock(&mountlist_mtx);
nmp = TAILQ_NEXT(mp, mnt_list);
vfs_unbusy(mp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_unlock(&mountlist_mtx);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (sfsp && count > maxcount)
td->td_retval[0] = maxcount;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
else
td->td_retval[0] = count;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Change current working directory to a given file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct fchdir_args {
int fd;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
fchdir(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct fchdir_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct filedesc *fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
struct vnode *vp, *tdp, *vpold;
struct mount *mp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct file *fp;
int error;
if ((error = getvnode(fdp, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
VREF(vp);
fdrop(fp, td);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
error = ENOTDIR;
#ifdef MAC
else if ((error = mac_check_vnode_chdir(td->td_ucred, vp)) != 0) {
}
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
else
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, td->td_ucred, td);
while (!error && (mp = vp->v_mountedhere) != NULL) {
if (vfs_busy(mp, 0, 0, td))
continue;
error = VFS_ROOT(mp, &tdp);
vfs_unbusy(mp, td);
if (error)
break;
vput(vp);
vp = tdp;
}
if (error) {
vput(vp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
vpold = fdp->fd_cdir;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fdp->fd_cdir = vp;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
vrele(vpold);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Change current working directory (``.'').
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct chdir_args {
char *path;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
chdir(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct chdir_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct filedesc *fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = change_dir(&nd, td)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
vp = fdp->fd_cdir;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fdp->fd_cdir = nd.ni_vp;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
vrele(vp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Helper function for raised chroot(2) security function: Refuse if
* any filedescriptors are open directories.
*/
static int
chroot_refuse_vdir_fds(fdp)
struct filedesc *fdp;
{
struct vnode *vp;
struct file *fp;
int fd;
FILEDESC_LOCK_ASSERT(fdp, MA_OWNED);
for (fd = 0; fd < fdp->fd_nfiles ; fd++) {
fp = fget_locked(fdp, fd);
if (fp == NULL)
continue;
if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_VNODE) {
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
return (EPERM);
}
}
return (0);
}
/*
* This sysctl determines if we will allow a process to chroot(2) if it
* has a directory open:
* 0: disallowed for all processes.
* 1: allowed for processes that were not already chroot(2)'ed.
* 2: allowed for all processes.
*/
static int chroot_allow_open_directories = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, chroot_allow_open_directories, CTLFLAG_RW,
&chroot_allow_open_directories, 0, "");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Change notion of root (``/'') directory.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct chroot_args {
char *path;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
chroot(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct chroot_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct filedesc *fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = suser_cred(td->td_ucred, PRISON_ROOT);
if (error)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
mtx_lock(&Giant);
if ((error = change_dir(&nd, td)) != 0)
goto error;
#ifdef MAC
if ((error = mac_check_vnode_chroot(td->td_ucred, nd.ni_vp)))
goto error;
#endif
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
if (chroot_allow_open_directories == 0 ||
(chroot_allow_open_directories == 1 && fdp->fd_rdir != rootvnode)) {
error = chroot_refuse_vdir_fds(fdp);
if (error)
goto error_unlock;
}
vp = fdp->fd_rdir;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fdp->fd_rdir = nd.ni_vp;
if (!fdp->fd_jdir) {
fdp->fd_jdir = nd.ni_vp;
VREF(fdp->fd_jdir);
}
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vrele(vp);
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
error_unlock:
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
error:
mtx_unlock(&Giant);
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
return (error);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
/*
* Common routine for chroot and chdir.
*/
static int
change_dir(ndp, td)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
register struct nameidata *ndp;
struct thread *td;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
error = namei(ndp);
if (error)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = ndp->ni_vp;
if (vp->v_type != VDIR)
error = ENOTDIR;
#ifdef MAC
else if ((error = mac_check_vnode_chdir(td->td_ucred, vp)) != 0) {
}
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
else
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VEXEC, td->td_ucred, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (error)
vput(vp);
else
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Check permissions, allocate an open file structure,
* and call the device open routine if any.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct open_args {
char *path;
int flags;
int mode;
};
#endif
int
open(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct open_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
struct file *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vat;
struct mount *mp;
1997-10-28 10:29:55 +00:00
int cmode, flags, oflags;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct file *nfp;
int type, indx, error;
struct flock lf;
struct nameidata nd;
1997-10-28 10:29:55 +00:00
oflags = SCARG(uap, flags);
if ((oflags & O_ACCMODE) == O_ACCMODE)
return (EINVAL);
1997-10-28 10:29:55 +00:00
flags = FFLAGS(oflags);
error = falloc(td, &nfp, &indx);
if (error)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
fp = nfp;
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
cmode = ((SCARG(uap, mode) &~ fdp->fd_cmask) & ALLPERMS) &~ S_ISTXT;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
td->td_dupfd = -indx - 1; /* XXX check for fdopen */
/*
* Bump the ref count to prevent another process from closing
* the descriptor while we are blocked in vn_open()
*/
fhold(fp);
error = vn_open(&nd, &flags, cmode);
if (error) {
/*
* release our own reference
*/
fdrop(fp, td);
/*
* handle special fdopen() case. bleh. dupfdopen() is
* responsible for dropping the old contents of ofiles[indx]
* if it succeeds.
*/
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if ((error == ENODEV || error == ENXIO) &&
td->td_dupfd >= 0 && /* XXX from fdopen */
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
(error =
dupfdopen(td, fdp, indx, td->td_dupfd, flags, error)) == 0) {
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Clean up the descriptor, but only if another thread hadn't
* replaced or closed it.
*/
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
if (fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] == fp) {
fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] = NULL;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
fdrop(fp, td);
} else
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (error == ERESTART)
error = EINTR;
return (error);
}
td->td_dupfd = 0;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vp = nd.ni_vp;
/*
* There should be 2 references on the file, one from the descriptor
* table, and one for us.
*
* Handle the case where someone closed the file (via its file
* descriptor) while we were blocked. The end result should look
* like opening the file succeeded but it was immediately closed.
*/
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
FILE_LOCK(fp);
if (fp->f_count == 1) {
KASSERT(fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] != fp,
("Open file descriptor lost all refs"));
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
FILE_UNLOCK(fp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_close(vp, flags & FMASK, fp->f_cred, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
return 0;
}
/* assert that vn_open created a backing object if one is needed */
KASSERT(!vn_canvmio(vp) || VOP_GETVOBJECT(vp, NULL) == 0,
("open: vmio vnode has no backing object after vn_open"));
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
fp->f_data = vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fp->f_flag = flags & FMASK;
fp->f_ops = &vnops;
fp->f_type = (vp->v_type == VFIFO ? DTYPE_FIFO : DTYPE_VNODE);
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
FILE_UNLOCK(fp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (flags & (O_EXLOCK | O_SHLOCK)) {
lf.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
lf.l_start = 0;
lf.l_len = 0;
if (flags & O_EXLOCK)
lf.l_type = F_WRLCK;
else
lf.l_type = F_RDLCK;
type = F_FLOCK;
if ((flags & FNONBLOCK) == 0)
type |= F_WAIT;
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
if ((error = VOP_ADVLOCK(vp, (caddr_t)fp, F_SETLK, &lf,
type)) != 0)
goto bad;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fp->f_flag |= FHASLOCK;
}
if (flags & O_TRUNC) {
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
goto bad;
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
VATTR_NULL(&vat);
vat.va_size = 0;
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_write(td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred, vp);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vat, td->td_ucred, td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
if (error)
goto bad;
}
/*
* Release our private reference, leaving the one associated with
* the descriptor table intact.
*/
fdrop(fp, td);
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
bad:
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
if (fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] == fp) {
fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] = NULL;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
fdrop(fp, td);
} else
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
return (error);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
#ifdef COMPAT_43
/*
* Create a file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct ocreat_args {
char *path;
int mode;
};
#endif
int
ocreat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct ocreat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct open_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ nuap;
SCARG(&nuap, path) = SCARG(uap, path);
SCARG(&nuap, mode) = SCARG(uap, mode);
SCARG(&nuap, flags) = O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
return (open(td, &nuap));
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
/*
* Create a special file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct mknod_args {
char *path;
int mode;
int dev;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
mknod(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct mknod_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
syscallarg(int) dev;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
struct mount *mp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
int whiteout = 0;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct nameidata nd;
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 12:38:52 +01:00
switch (SCARG(uap, mode) & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFCHR:
case S_IFBLK:
error = suser(td);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 12:38:52 +01:00
break;
default:
error = suser_cred(td->td_ucred, PRISON_ROOT);
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 12:38:52 +01:00
break;
}
if (error)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp != NULL) {
vrele(vp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = EEXIST;
} else {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
FILEDESC_LOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
vattr.va_mode = (SCARG(uap, mode) & ALLPERMS) &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
vattr.va_rdev = SCARG(uap, dev);
whiteout = 0;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
switch (SCARG(uap, mode) & S_IFMT) {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
case S_IFMT: /* used by badsect to flag bad sectors */
vattr.va_type = VBAD;
break;
case S_IFCHR:
vattr.va_type = VCHR;
break;
case S_IFBLK:
vattr.va_type = VBLK;
break;
case S_IFWHT:
whiteout = 1;
break;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (!error) {
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
if (whiteout)
error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, CREATE);
else {
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp,
&nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
1999-11-13 14:35:50 +00:00
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "mknod");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "mknod");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Create a named pipe.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct mkfifo_args {
char *path;
int mode;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
mkfifo(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct mkfifo_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct mount *mp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EEXIST);
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_type = VFIFO;
FILEDESC_LOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
vattr.va_mode = (SCARG(uap, mode) & ALLPERMS) &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
error = VOP_MKNOD(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
1999-11-13 14:35:50 +00:00
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return (error);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
/*
* Make a hard file link.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct link_args {
char *path;
char *link;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
link(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct link_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(char *) link;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
struct mount *mp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct nameidata nd;
int error;
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW|NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
vrele(vp);
return (EPERM); /* POSIX */
}
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | NOOBJ | SAVENAME, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, link), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) == 0) {
if (nd.ni_vp != NULL) {
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
error = EEXIST;
} else {
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
error = VOP_LINK(nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
vrele(vp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "link");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "link");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Make a symbolic link.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct symlink_args {
char *path;
char *link;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
symlink(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct symlink_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(char *) link;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct mount *mp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct vattr vattr;
char *path;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
path = uma_zalloc(namei_zone, M_WAITOK);
if ((error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, path), path, MAXPATHLEN, NULL)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
goto out;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | NOOBJ | SAVENAME, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, link), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
goto out;
if (nd.ni_vp) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = EEXIST;
goto out;
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
FILEDESC_LOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
vattr.va_mode = ACCESSPERMS &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = VOP_SYMLINK(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr, path);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (error == 0)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "symlink");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "symlink");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
out:
uma_zfree(namei_zone, path);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Delete a whiteout from the filesystem.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
undelete(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct undelete_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
{
int error;
struct mount *mp;
struct nameidata nd;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT|DOWHITEOUT, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
return (error);
if (nd.ni_vp != NULLVP || !(nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags & ISWHITEOUT)) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (nd.ni_vp)
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
return (EEXIST);
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
error = VOP_WHITEOUT(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_cnd, DELETE);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "undelete");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "undelete");
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Delete a name from the filesystem.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct unlink_args {
char *path;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
unlink(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct unlink_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EPERM; /* POSIX */
else {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* The root of a mounted filesystem cannot be deleted.
*
* XXX: can this only be a VDIR case?
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
mp_fixme("Accessing vflags w/o the vn lock.");
if (vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = EBUSY;
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vrele(vp);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (!error) {
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
error = VOP_REMOVE(nd.ni_dvp, vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vput(vp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "unlink");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "unlink");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Reposition read/write file offset.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct lseek_args {
int fd;
int pad;
off_t offset;
int whence;
};
#endif
int
lseek(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lseek_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
syscallarg(int) whence;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct ucred *cred = td->td_ucred;
struct file *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
struct vattr vattr;
off_t offset;
int error, noneg;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if ((error = fget(td, uap->fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (ESPIPE);
}
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
noneg = (vp->v_type != VCHR);
offset = SCARG(uap, offset);
switch (SCARG(uap, whence)) {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
case L_INCR:
if (noneg &&
2001-08-29 19:35:53 +01:00
(fp->f_offset < 0 ||
(offset > 0 && fp->f_offset > OFF_MAX - offset)))
return (EOVERFLOW);
offset += fp->f_offset;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
break;
case L_XTND:
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, cred, td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
if (error)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
if (noneg &&
2001-08-29 19:35:53 +01:00
(vattr.va_size > OFF_MAX ||
(offset > 0 && vattr.va_size > OFF_MAX - offset)))
return (EOVERFLOW);
offset += vattr.va_size;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
break;
case L_SET:
break;
default:
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EINVAL);
}
if (noneg && offset < 0)
return (EINVAL);
fp->f_offset = offset;
*(off_t *)(td->td_retval) = fp->f_offset;
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
#if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
/*
* Reposition read/write file offset.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct olseek_args {
int fd;
long offset;
int whence;
};
#endif
int
olseek(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct olseek_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(long) offset;
syscallarg(int) whence;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct lseek_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) offset;
syscallarg(int) whence;
} */ nuap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
int error;
SCARG(&nuap, fd) = SCARG(uap, fd);
SCARG(&nuap, offset) = SCARG(uap, offset);
SCARG(&nuap, whence) = SCARG(uap, whence);
error = lseek(td, &nuap);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
/*
* Check access permissions using passed credentials.
*/
static int
vn_access(vp, user_flags, cred, td)
struct vnode *vp;
int user_flags;
struct ucred *cred;
struct thread *td;
{
int error, flags;
/* Flags == 0 means only check for existence. */
error = 0;
if (user_flags) {
flags = 0;
if (user_flags & R_OK)
flags |= VREAD;
if (user_flags & W_OK)
flags |= VWRITE;
if (user_flags & X_OK)
flags |= VEXEC;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_access(cred, vp, flags);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
if ((flags & VWRITE) == 0 || (error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0)
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, flags, cred, td);
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Check access permissions using "real" credentials.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct access_args {
char *path;
int flags;
};
#endif
int
access(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct access_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct ucred *cred, *tmpcred;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
register struct vnode *vp;
int error;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct nameidata nd;
/*
* Create and modify a temporary credential instead of one that
* is potentially shared. This could also mess up socket
* buffer accounting which can run in an interrupt context.
*
* XXX - Depending on how "threads" are finally implemented, it
* may be better to explicitly pass the credential to namei()
* rather than to modify the potentially shared process structure.
*/
cred = td->td_ucred;
tmpcred = crdup(cred);
o Merge contents of struct pcred into struct ucred. Specifically, add the real uid, saved uid, real gid, and saved gid to ucred, as well as the pcred->pc_uidinfo, which was associated with the real uid, only rename it to cr_ruidinfo so as not to conflict with cr_uidinfo, which corresponds to the effective uid. o Remove p_cred from struct proc; add p_ucred to struct proc, replacing original macro that pointed. p->p_ucred to p->p_cred->pc_ucred. o Universally update code so that it makes use of ucred instead of pcred, p->p_ucred instead of p->p_pcred, cr_ruidinfo instead of p_uidinfo, cr_{r,sv}{u,g}id instead of p_*, etc. o Remove pcred0 and its initialization from init_main.c; initialize cr_ruidinfo there. o Restruction many credential modification chunks to always crdup while we figure out locking and optimizations; generally speaking, this means moving to a structure like this: newcred = crdup(oldcred); ... p->p_ucred = newcred; crfree(oldcred); It's not race-free, but better than nothing. There are also races in sys_process.c, all inter-process authorization, fork, exec, and exit. o Remove sigio->sio_ruid since sigio->sio_ucred now contains the ruid; remove comments indicating that the old arrangement was a problem. o Restructure exec1() a little to use newcred/oldcred arrangement, and use improved uid management primitives. o Clean up exit1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup due to pcred removal. o Clean up fork1() so as to do less work in credential cleanup and allocation. o Clean up ktrcanset() to take into account changes, and move to using suser_xxx() instead of performing a direct uid==0 comparision. o Improve commenting in various kern_prot.c credential modification calls to better document current behavior. In a couple of places, current behavior is a little questionable and we need to check POSIX.1 to make sure it's "right". More commenting work still remains to be done. o Update credential management calls, such as crfree(), to take into account new ruidinfo reference. o Modify or add the following uid and gid helper routines: change_euid() change_egid() change_ruid() change_rgid() change_svuid() change_svgid() In each case, the call now acts on a credential not a process, and as such no longer requires more complicated process locking/etc. They now assume the caller will do any necessary allocation of an exclusive credential reference. Each is commented to document its reference requirements. o CANSIGIO() is simplified to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. o Remove lots of (p_pcred==NULL) checks. o Add an XXX to authorization code in nfs_lock.c, since it's questionable, and needs to be considered carefully. o Simplify posix4 authorization code to require only credentials, not processes and pcreds. Note that this authorization, as well as CANSIGIO(), needs to be updated to use the p_cansignal() and p_cansched() centralized authorization routines, as they currently do not take into account some desirable restrictions that are handled by the centralized routines, as well as being inconsistent with other similar authorization instances. o Update libkvm to take these changes into account. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: green, bde, jhb, freebsd-arch, freebsd-audit
2001-05-25 17:59:11 +01:00
tmpcred->cr_uid = cred->cr_ruid;
tmpcred->cr_groups[0] = cred->cr_rgid;
td->td_ucred = tmpcred;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
goto out1;
vp = nd.ni_vp;
error = vn_access(vp, SCARG(uap, flags), tmpcred, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vput(vp);
out1:
td->td_ucred = cred;
crfree(tmpcred);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Check access permissions using "effective" credentials.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct eaccess_args {
char *path;
int flags;
};
#endif
int
eaccess(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct eaccess_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
error = vn_access(vp, SCARG(uap, flags), td->td_ucred, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
#if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
/*
* Get file status; this version follows links.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct ostat_args {
char *path;
struct ostat *ub;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
ostat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct ostat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct ostat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct stat sb;
struct ostat osb;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(nd.ni_vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vput(nd.ni_vp);
if (error)
return (error);
cvtstat(&sb, &osb);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&osb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (osb));
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Get file status; this version does not follow links.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct olstat_args {
char *path;
struct ostat *ub;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
olstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct olstat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct ostat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
struct stat sb;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct ostat osb;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return (error);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
cvtstat(&sb, &osb);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&osb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (osb));
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Convert from an old to a new stat structure.
*/
void
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
cvtstat(st, ost)
struct stat *st;
struct ostat *ost;
{
ost->st_dev = st->st_dev;
ost->st_ino = st->st_ino;
ost->st_mode = st->st_mode;
ost->st_nlink = st->st_nlink;
ost->st_uid = st->st_uid;
ost->st_gid = st->st_gid;
ost->st_rdev = st->st_rdev;
if (st->st_size < (quad_t)1 << 32)
ost->st_size = st->st_size;
else
ost->st_size = -2;
ost->st_atime = st->st_atime;
ost->st_mtime = st->st_mtime;
ost->st_ctime = st->st_ctime;
ost->st_blksize = st->st_blksize;
ost->st_blocks = st->st_blocks;
ost->st_flags = st->st_flags;
ost->st_gen = st->st_gen;
}
#endif /* COMPAT_43 || COMPAT_SUNOS */
/*
* Get file status; this version follows links.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct stat_args {
char *path;
struct stat *ub;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
stat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct stat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct stat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct stat sb;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
#ifdef LOOKUP_SHARED
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKSHARED | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ,
UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
#else
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
#endif
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(nd.ni_vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vput(nd.ni_vp);
if (error)
return (error);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (sb));
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Get file status; this version does not follow links.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct lstat_args {
char *path;
struct stat *ub;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
lstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lstat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct stat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
int error;
struct vnode *vp;
struct stat sb;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return (error);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (sb));
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Implementation of the NetBSD stat() function.
* XXX This should probably be collapsed with the FreeBSD version,
* as the differences are only due to vn_stat() clearing spares at
* the end of the structures. vn_stat could be split to avoid this,
* and thus collapse the following to close to zero code.
*/
void
cvtnstat(sb, nsb)
struct stat *sb;
struct nstat *nsb;
{
bzero(nsb, sizeof *nsb);
nsb->st_dev = sb->st_dev;
nsb->st_ino = sb->st_ino;
nsb->st_mode = sb->st_mode;
nsb->st_nlink = sb->st_nlink;
nsb->st_uid = sb->st_uid;
nsb->st_gid = sb->st_gid;
nsb->st_rdev = sb->st_rdev;
nsb->st_atimespec = sb->st_atimespec;
nsb->st_mtimespec = sb->st_mtimespec;
nsb->st_ctimespec = sb->st_ctimespec;
nsb->st_size = sb->st_size;
nsb->st_blocks = sb->st_blocks;
nsb->st_blksize = sb->st_blksize;
nsb->st_flags = sb->st_flags;
nsb->st_gen = sb->st_gen;
nsb->st_birthtimespec = sb->st_birthtimespec;
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct nstat_args {
char *path;
struct nstat *ub;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
nstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct nstat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct nstat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
{
struct stat sb;
struct nstat nsb;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(nd.ni_vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
vput(nd.ni_vp);
if (error)
return (error);
cvtnstat(&sb, &nsb);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&nsb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (nsb));
return (error);
}
/*
* NetBSD lstat. Get file status; this version does not follow links.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct lstat_args {
char *path;
struct stat *ub;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
nlstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct nlstat_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct nstat *) ub;
} */ *uap;
{
int error;
struct vnode *vp;
struct stat sb;
struct nstat nsb;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return (error);
cvtnstat(&sb, &nsb);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&nsb, SCARG(uap, ub), sizeof (nsb));
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Get configurable pathname variables.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct pathconf_args {
char *path;
int name;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
pathconf(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct pathconf_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) name;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = VOP_PATHCONF(nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, name), td->td_retval);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vput(nd.ni_vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Return target name of a symbolic link.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct readlink_args {
char *path;
char *buf;
int count;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
readlink(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct readlink_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(int) count;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct vnode *vp;
struct iovec aiov;
struct uio auio;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW | LOCKLEAF | NOOBJ, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vp = nd.ni_vp;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_readlink(td->td_ucred, vp);
if (error) {
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (vp->v_type != VLNK)
error = EINVAL;
else {
aiov.iov_base = SCARG(uap, buf);
aiov.iov_len = SCARG(uap, count);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_offset = 0;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_td = td;
auio.uio_resid = SCARG(uap, count);
error = VOP_READLINK(vp, &auio, td->td_ucred);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
vput(vp);
td->td_retval[0] = SCARG(uap, count) - auio.uio_resid;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Common implementation code for chflags() and fchflags().
*/
static int
setfflags(td, vp, flags)
struct thread *td;
struct vnode *vp;
int flags;
{
int error;
struct mount *mp;
struct vattr vattr;
/*
* Prevent non-root users from setting flags on devices. When
* a device is reused, users can retain ownership of the device
* if they are allowed to set flags and programs assume that
* chown can't fail when done as root.
*/
if (vp->v_type == VCHR || vp->v_type == VBLK) {
error = suser_cred(td->td_ucred, PRISON_ROOT);
if (error)
return (error);
}
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setflags(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_flags);
if (error == 0) {
#endif
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_flags = flags;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
#ifdef MAC
}
#endif
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return (error);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Change flags of a file given a path name.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct chflags_args {
char *path;
int flags;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
chflags(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct chflags_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfflags(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, flags));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return error;
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}
/*
* Same as chflags() but doesn't follow symlinks.
*/
int
lchflags(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lchflags_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfflags(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, flags));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return error;
}
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/*
* Change flags of a file given a file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct fchflags_args {
int fd;
int flags;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
fchflags(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct fchflags_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct file *fp;
int error;
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
error = setfflags(td, (struct vnode *) fp->f_data, SCARG(uap, flags));
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*
* Common implementation code for chmod(), lchmod() and fchmod().
*/
static int
setfmode(td, vp, mode)
struct thread *td;
struct vnode *vp;
int mode;
{
int error;
struct mount *mp;
struct vattr vattr;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_mode = mode & ALLPERMS;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setmode(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_mode);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return error;
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}
/*
* Change mode of a file given path name.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct chmod_args {
char *path;
int mode;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
chmod(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct chmod_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
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{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfmode(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, mode));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return error;
}
/*
* Change mode of a file given path name (don't follow links.)
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct lchmod_args {
char *path;
int mode;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
lchmod(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lchmod_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfmode(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, mode));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return error;
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}
/*
* Change mode of a file given a file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct fchmod_args {
int fd;
int mode;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
fchmod(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct fchmod_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct file *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
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int error;
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
error = setfmode(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data, SCARG(uap, mode));
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*
* Common implementation for chown(), lchown(), and fchown()
*/
static int
setfown(td, vp, uid, gid)
struct thread *td;
struct vnode *vp;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
{
int error;
struct mount *mp;
struct vattr vattr;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_uid = uid;
vattr.va_gid = gid;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setowner(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_uid,
vattr.va_gid);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return error;
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}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct chown_args {
char *path;
int uid;
int gid;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
chown(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct chown_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) uid;
syscallarg(int) gid;
} */ *uap;
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{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfown(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
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return (error);
}
/*
* Set ownership given a path name, do not cross symlinks.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct lchown_args {
char *path;
int uid;
int gid;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
lchown(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lchown_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) uid;
syscallarg(int) gid;
} */ *uap;
{
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setfown(td, nd.ni_vp, SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid));
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return (error);
}
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/*
* Set ownership given a file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct fchown_args {
int fd;
int uid;
int gid;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
fchown(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct fchown_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) uid;
syscallarg(int) gid;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct file *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
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int error;
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
error = setfown(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data,
SCARG(uap, uid), SCARG(uap, gid));
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*
* Common implementation code for utimes(), lutimes(), and futimes().
*/
static int
getutimes(usrtvp, tsp)
const struct timeval *usrtvp;
struct timespec *tsp;
{
struct timeval tv[2];
int error;
if (usrtvp == NULL) {
microtime(&tv[0]);
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tv[0], &tsp[0]);
tsp[1] = tsp[0];
} else {
if ((error = copyin(usrtvp, tv, sizeof (tv))) != 0)
return (error);
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tv[0], &tsp[0]);
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tv[1], &tsp[1]);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Common implementation code for utimes(), lutimes(), and futimes().
*/
static int
setutimes(td, vp, ts, numtimes, nullflag)
struct thread *td;
struct vnode *vp;
const struct timespec *ts;
int numtimes;
int nullflag;
{
int error, setbirthtime;
struct mount *mp;
struct vattr vattr;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
setbirthtime = 0;
if (numtimes < 3 && VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td) == 0 &&
timespeccmp(&ts[1], &vattr.va_birthtime, < ))
setbirthtime = 1;
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_atime = ts[0];
vattr.va_mtime = ts[1];
if (setbirthtime)
vattr.va_birthtime = ts[1];
if (numtimes > 2)
vattr.va_birthtime = ts[2];
if (nullflag)
vattr.va_vaflags |= VA_UTIMES_NULL;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setutimes(td->td_ucred, vp, vattr.va_atime,
vattr.va_mtime);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return error;
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}
/*
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct utimes_args {
char *path;
struct timeval *tptr;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
utimes(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct utimes_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct timeval *) tptr;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct timespec ts[2];
struct timeval *usrtvp;
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int error;
struct nameidata nd;
usrtvp = SCARG(uap, tptr);
if ((error = getutimes(usrtvp, ts)) != 0)
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setutimes(td, nd.ni_vp, ts, 2, usrtvp == NULL);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
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return (error);
}
/*
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct lutimes_args {
char *path;
struct timeval *tptr;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
lutimes(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct lutimes_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(struct timeval *) tptr;
} */ *uap;
{
struct timespec ts[2];
struct timeval *usrtvp;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
usrtvp = SCARG(uap, tptr);
if ((error = getutimes(usrtvp, ts)) != 0)
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = setutimes(td, nd.ni_vp, ts, 2, usrtvp == NULL);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Set the access and modification times of a file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct futimes_args {
int fd;
struct timeval *tptr;
};
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
int
futimes(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct futimes_args /* {
syscallarg(int ) fd;
syscallarg(struct timeval *) tptr;
} */ *uap;
{
struct timespec ts[2];
struct file *fp;
struct timeval *usrtvp;
int error;
usrtvp = SCARG(uap, tptr);
if ((error = getutimes(usrtvp, ts)) != 0)
return (error);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = setutimes(td, (struct vnode *)fp->f_data, ts, 2, usrtvp==NULL);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
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/*
* Truncate a file given its path name.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct truncate_args {
char *path;
int pad;
off_t length;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
truncate(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct truncate_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
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struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
if (uap->length < 0)
return(EINVAL);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
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return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
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if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EISDIR;
#ifdef MAC
else if ((error = mac_check_vnode_write(td->td_ucred, NOCRED, vp))) {
}
#endif
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else if ((error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0 &&
(error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, VWRITE, td->td_ucred, td)) == 0) {
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VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_size = SCARG(uap, length);
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
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}
vput(vp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
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return (error);
}
/*
* Truncate a file given a file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct ftruncate_args {
int fd;
int pad;
off_t length;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
ftruncate(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct ftruncate_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct mount *mp;
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struct vattr vattr;
struct vnode *vp;
struct file *fp;
int error;
if (uap->length < 0)
return(EINVAL);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FWRITE) == 0) {
fdrop(fp, td);
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return (EINVAL);
}
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vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (vp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EISDIR;
#ifdef MAC
else if ((error = mac_check_vnode_write(td->td_ucred, fp->f_cred,
vp))) {
}
#endif
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else if ((error = vn_writechk(vp)) == 0) {
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_size = SCARG(uap, length);
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, &vattr, fp->f_cred, td);
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}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
fdrop(fp, td);
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return (error);
}
#if defined(COMPAT_43) || defined(COMPAT_SUNOS)
/*
* Truncate a file given its path name.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct otruncate_args {
char *path;
long length;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
otruncate(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct otruncate_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(long) length;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct truncate_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */ nuap;
SCARG(&nuap, path) = SCARG(uap, path);
SCARG(&nuap, length) = SCARG(uap, length);
return (truncate(td, &nuap));
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}
/*
* Truncate a file given a file descriptor.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct oftruncate_args {
int fd;
long length;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
oftruncate(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct oftruncate_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(long) length;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct ftruncate_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) pad;
syscallarg(off_t) length;
} */ nuap;
SCARG(&nuap, fd) = SCARG(uap, fd);
SCARG(&nuap, length) = SCARG(uap, length);
return (ftruncate(td, &nuap));
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}
#endif /* COMPAT_43 || COMPAT_SUNOS */
/*
* Sync an open file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct fsync_args {
int fd;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
fsync(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct fsync_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct vnode *vp;
struct mount *mp;
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struct file *fp;
vm_object_t obj;
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int error;
GIANT_REQUIRED;
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
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return (error);
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
if (VOP_GETVOBJECT(vp, &obj) == 0) {
vm_object_page_clean(obj, 0, 0, 0);
}
error = VOP_FSYNC(vp, fp->f_cred, MNT_WAIT, td);
if (error == 0 && vp->v_mount && (vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_SOFTDEP)
&& softdep_fsync_hook != NULL)
error = (*softdep_fsync_hook)(vp);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
fdrop(fp, td);
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return (error);
}
/*
* Rename files. Source and destination must either both be directories,
* or both not be directories. If target is a directory, it must be empty.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
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struct rename_args {
char *from;
char *to;
};
#endif
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/* ARGSUSED */
int
rename(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct rename_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) from;
syscallarg(char *) to;
} */ *uap;
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{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *tvp, *fvp, *tdvp;
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struct nameidata fromnd, tond;
int error;
bwillwrite();
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NDINIT(&fromnd, DELETE, WANTPARENT | SAVESTART, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, from), td);
if ((error = namei(&fromnd)) != 0)
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return (error);
fvp = fromnd.ni_vp;
if ((error = vn_start_write(fvp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
vrele(fvp);
goto out1;
}
NDINIT(&tond, RENAME, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF | NOCACHE | SAVESTART | NOOBJ,
UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, to), td);
if (fromnd.ni_vp->v_type == VDIR)
tond.ni_cnd.cn_flags |= WILLBEDIR;
if ((error = namei(&tond)) != 0) {
/* Translate error code for rename("dir1", "dir2/."). */
if (error == EISDIR && fvp->v_type == VDIR)
error = EINVAL;
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
vrele(fvp);
goto out1;
}
tdvp = tond.ni_dvp;
tvp = tond.ni_vp;
if (tvp != NULL) {
if (fvp->v_type == VDIR && tvp->v_type != VDIR) {
error = ENOTDIR;
goto out;
} else if (fvp->v_type != VDIR && tvp->v_type == VDIR) {
error = EISDIR;
goto out;
}
}
if (fvp == tdvp)
error = EINVAL;
/*
* If source is the same as the destination (that is the
* same inode number with the same name in the same directory),
* then there is nothing to do.
*/
if (fvp == tvp && fromnd.ni_dvp == tdvp &&
fromnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen == tond.ni_cnd.cn_namelen &&
!bcmp(fromnd.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr, tond.ni_cnd.cn_nameptr,
fromnd.ni_cnd.cn_namelen))
error = -1;
out:
if (!error) {
VOP_LEASE(tdvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
if (fromnd.ni_dvp != tdvp) {
VOP_LEASE(fromnd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
}
if (tvp) {
VOP_LEASE(tvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = VOP_RENAME(fromnd.ni_dvp, fromnd.ni_vp, &fromnd.ni_cnd,
tond.ni_dvp, tond.ni_vp, &tond.ni_cnd);
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
NDFREE(&tond, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
} else {
NDFREE(&fromnd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
NDFREE(&tond, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (tdvp == tvp)
vrele(tdvp);
else
vput(tdvp);
if (tvp)
vput(tvp);
vrele(fromnd.ni_dvp);
vrele(fvp);
}
vrele(tond.ni_startdir);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(fromnd.ni_dvp, "rename");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(fromnd.ni_vp, "rename");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(tond.ni_dvp, "rename");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(tond.ni_vp, "rename");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
out1:
if (fromnd.ni_startdir)
vrele(fromnd.ni_startdir);
if (error == -1)
return (0);
return (error);
}
/*
* Make a directory file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct mkdir_args {
char *path;
int mode;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
mkdir(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct mkdir_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
syscallarg(int) mode;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
return vn_mkdir(uap->path, uap->mode, UIO_USERSPACE, td);
}
int
vn_mkdir(path, mode, segflg, td)
char *path;
int mode;
enum uio_seg segflg;
struct thread *td;
{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, CREATE, LOCKPARENT | SAVENAME, segflg, path, td);
nd.ni_cnd.cn_flags |= WILLBEDIR;
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp != NULL) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vrele(vp);
/*
* XXX namei called with LOCKPARENT but not LOCKLEAF has
* the strange behaviour of leaving the vnode unlocked
* if the target is the same vnode as the parent.
*/
if (vp == nd.ni_dvp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EEXIST);
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
VATTR_NULL(&vattr);
vattr.va_type = VDIR;
FILEDESC_LOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
vattr.va_mode = (mode & ACCESSPERMS) &~ td->td_proc->p_fd->fd_cmask;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = VOP_MKDIR(nd.ni_dvp, &nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd, &vattr);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if (!error)
vput(nd.ni_vp);
vn_finished_write(mp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "mkdir");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "mkdir");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
/*
* Remove a directory file.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct rmdir_args {
char *path;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
rmdir(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct rmdir_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
restart:
bwillwrite();
NDINIT(&nd, DELETE, LOCKPARENT | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE,
SCARG(uap, path), td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
error = ENOTDIR;
goto out;
}
/*
* No rmdir "." please.
*/
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp) {
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* The root of a mounted filesystem cannot be deleted.
*/
if (vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) {
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
error = EBUSY;
goto out;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
if (vn_start_write(nd.ni_dvp, &mp, V_NOWAIT) != 0) {
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vput(vp);
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_XSLEEP | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
goto restart;
}
VOP_LEASE(nd.ni_dvp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
error = VOP_RMDIR(nd.ni_dvp, nd.ni_vp, &nd.ni_cnd);
vn_finished_write(mp);
out:
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (nd.ni_dvp == vp)
vrele(nd.ni_dvp);
else
vput(nd.ni_dvp);
vput(vp);
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_dvp, "rmdir");
ASSERT_VOP_UNLOCKED(nd.ni_vp, "rmdir");
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
#ifdef COMPAT_43
/*
2002-05-16 22:28:32 +01:00
* Read a block of directory entries in a filesystem independent format.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct ogetdirentries_args {
int fd;
char *buf;
u_int count;
long *basep;
};
#endif
int
ogetdirentries(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct ogetdirentries_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(u_int) count;
syscallarg(long *) basep;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct file *fp;
struct uio auio, kuio;
struct iovec aiov, kiov;
struct dirent *dp, *edp;
caddr_t dirbuf;
int error, eofflag, readcnt;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
long loff;
/* XXX arbitrary sanity limit on `count'. */
if (SCARG(uap, count) > 64 * 1024)
return (EINVAL);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EBADF);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
unionread:
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EINVAL);
}
aiov.iov_base = SCARG(uap, buf);
aiov.iov_len = SCARG(uap, count);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_td = td;
auio.uio_resid = SCARG(uap, count);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
loff = auio.uio_offset = fp->f_offset;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_readdir(td->td_ucred, vp);
if (error) {
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
# if (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN)
if (vp->v_mount->mnt_maxsymlinklen <= 0) {
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &auio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag,
NULL, NULL);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fp->f_offset = auio.uio_offset;
} else
# endif
{
kuio = auio;
kuio.uio_iov = &kiov;
kuio.uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
kiov.iov_len = SCARG(uap, count);
MALLOC(dirbuf, caddr_t, SCARG(uap, count), M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
kiov.iov_base = dirbuf;
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &kuio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag,
NULL, NULL);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fp->f_offset = kuio.uio_offset;
if (error == 0) {
readcnt = SCARG(uap, count) - kuio.uio_resid;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
edp = (struct dirent *)&dirbuf[readcnt];
for (dp = (struct dirent *)dirbuf; dp < edp; ) {
# if (BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN)
/*
* The expected low byte of
* dp->d_namlen is our dp->d_type.
* The high MBZ byte of dp->d_namlen
* is our dp->d_namlen.
*/
dp->d_type = dp->d_namlen;
dp->d_namlen = 0;
# else
/*
* The dp->d_type is the high byte
* of the expected dp->d_namlen,
* so must be zero'ed.
*/
dp->d_type = 0;
# endif
if (dp->d_reclen > 0) {
dp = (struct dirent *)
((char *)dp + dp->d_reclen);
} else {
error = EIO;
break;
}
}
if (dp >= edp)
error = uiomove(dirbuf, readcnt, &auio);
}
FREE(dirbuf, M_TEMP);
}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
if (error) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
if (SCARG(uap, count) == auio.uio_resid) {
if (union_dircheckp) {
error = union_dircheckp(td, &vp, fp);
if (error == -1)
goto unionread;
if (error) {
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
}
mp_fixme("Accessing vflags w/o vn lock.");
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) &&
(vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_UNION)) {
struct vnode *tvp = vp;
vp = vp->v_mount->mnt_vnodecovered;
VREF(vp);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
fp->f_data = vp;
fp->f_offset = 0;
vrele(tvp);
goto unionread;
}
}
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&loff, SCARG(uap, basep), sizeof(long));
fdrop(fp, td);
td->td_retval[0] = SCARG(uap, count) - auio.uio_resid;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
#endif /* COMPAT_43 */
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
2002-05-16 22:28:32 +01:00
* Read a block of directory entries in a filesystem independent format.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct getdirentries_args {
int fd;
char *buf;
u_int count;
long *basep;
};
#endif
int
getdirentries(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct getdirentries_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(u_int) count;
syscallarg(long *) basep;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct file *fp;
struct uio auio;
struct iovec aiov;
long loff;
int error, eofflag;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fd), &fp)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EBADF);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
unionread:
if (vp->v_type != VDIR) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (EINVAL);
}
aiov.iov_base = SCARG(uap, buf);
aiov.iov_len = SCARG(uap, count);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_td = td;
auio.uio_resid = SCARG(uap, count);
/* vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY, td); */
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
loff = auio.uio_offset = fp->f_offset;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_readdir(td->td_ucred, vp);
if (error == 0)
#endif
error = VOP_READDIR(vp, &auio, fp->f_cred, &eofflag, NULL,
NULL);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
fp->f_offset = auio.uio_offset;
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
if (error) {
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
if (SCARG(uap, count) == auio.uio_resid) {
if (union_dircheckp) {
error = union_dircheckp(td, &vp, fp);
if (error == -1)
goto unionread;
if (error) {
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
}
mp_fixme("Accessing vflag without vn lock.");
if ((vp->v_vflag & VV_ROOT) &&
(vp->v_mount->mnt_flag & MNT_UNION)) {
struct vnode *tvp = vp;
vp = vp->v_mount->mnt_vnodecovered;
VREF(vp);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
fp->f_data = vp;
fp->f_offset = 0;
vrele(tvp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
goto unionread;
}
}
if (SCARG(uap, basep) != NULL) {
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
error = copyout(&loff, SCARG(uap, basep), sizeof(long));
}
td->td_retval[0] = SCARG(uap, count) - auio.uio_resid;
fdrop(fp, td);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct getdents_args {
int fd;
char *buf;
size_t count;
};
#endif
int
getdents(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct getdents_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(char *) buf;
syscallarg(u_int) count;
} */ *uap;
{
struct getdirentries_args ap;
ap.fd = uap->fd;
ap.buf = uap->buf;
ap.count = uap->count;
ap.basep = NULL;
return getdirentries(td, &ap);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/*
* Set the mode mask for creation of filesystem nodes.
Commit major SMP cleanups and move the BGL (big giant lock) in the syscall path inward. A system call may select whether it needs the MP lock or not (the default being that it does need it). A great deal of conditional SMP code for various deadended experiments has been removed. 'cil' and 'cml' have been removed entirely, and the locking around the cpl has been removed. The conditional separately-locked fast-interrupt code has been removed, meaning that interrupts must hold the CPL now (but they pretty much had to anyway). Another reason for doing this is that the original separate-lock for interrupts just doesn't apply to the interrupt thread mechanism being contemplated. Modifications to the cpl may now ONLY occur while holding the MP lock. For example, if an otherwise MP safe syscall needs to mess with the cpl, it must hold the MP lock for the duration and must (as usual) save/restore the cpl in a nested fashion. This is precursor work for the real meat coming later: avoiding having to hold the MP lock for common syscalls and I/O's and interrupt threads. It is expected that the spl mechanisms and new interrupt threading mechanisms will be able to run in tandem, allowing a slow piecemeal transition to occur. This patch should result in a moderate performance improvement due to the considerable amount of code that has been removed from the critical path, especially the simplification of the spl*() calls. The real performance gains will come later. Approved by: jkh Reviewed by: current, bde (exception.s) Some work taken from: luoqi's patch
2000-03-28 08:16:37 +01:00
*
* MP SAFE
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct umask_args {
int newmask;
};
#endif
int
umask(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct umask_args /* {
syscallarg(int) newmask;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
register struct filedesc *fdp;
FILEDESC_LOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
fdp = td->td_proc->p_fd;
td->td_retval[0] = fdp->fd_cmask;
fdp->fd_cmask = SCARG(uap, newmask) & ALLPERMS;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(td->td_proc->p_fd);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (0);
}
/*
* Void all references to file by ripping underlying filesystem
* away from vnode.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct revoke_args {
char *path;
};
#endif
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
/* ARGSUSED */
int
revoke(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct revoke_args /* {
syscallarg(char *) path;
} */ *uap;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct vattr vattr;
int error;
struct nameidata nd;
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE, SCARG(uap, path),
td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
return (error);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
if (vp->v_type != VCHR) {
vput(vp);
return (EINVAL);
}
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_revoke(td->td_ucred, vp);
if (error) {
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
#endif
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vattr, td->td_ucred, td);
if (error) {
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
if (td->td_ucred->cr_uid != vattr.va_uid) {
error = suser_cred(td->td_ucred, PRISON_ROOT);
if (error)
goto out;
}
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
goto out;
if (vcount(vp) > 1)
VOP_REVOKE(vp, REVOKEALL);
vn_finished_write(mp);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
out:
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Convert a user file descriptor to a kernel file entry.
* The file entry is locked upon returning.
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*/
int
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
getvnode(fdp, fd, fpp)
struct filedesc *fdp;
int fd;
struct file **fpp;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
{
int error;
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
struct file *fp;
fp = NULL;
if (fdp == NULL)
error = EBADF;
else {
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
if ((u_int)fd >= fdp->fd_nfiles ||
(fp = fdp->fd_ofiles[fd]) == NULL)
error = EBADF;
else if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE && fp->f_type != DTYPE_FIFO) {
fp = NULL;
error = EINVAL;
} else {
fhold(fp);
error = 0;
}
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
}
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
*fpp = fp;
return (error);
1994-05-24 11:09:53 +01:00
}
/*
* Get (NFS) file handle
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct getfh_args {
char *fname;
fhandle_t *fhp;
};
#endif
int
getfh(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct getfh_args *uap;
{
struct nameidata nd;
fhandle_t fh;
register struct vnode *vp;
int error;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->fname, td);
error = namei(&nd);
if (error)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
vp = nd.ni_vp;
bzero(&fh, sizeof(fh));
fh.fh_fsid = vp->v_mount->mnt_stat.f_fsid;
error = VFS_VPTOFH(vp, &fh.fh_fid);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return (error);
error = copyout(&fh, uap->fhp, sizeof (fh));
return (error);
}
/*
* syscall for the rpc.lockd to use to translate a NFS file handle into
* an open descriptor.
*
* warning: do not remove the suser() call or this becomes one giant
* security hole.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct fhopen_args {
const struct fhandle *u_fhp;
int flags;
};
#endif
int
fhopen(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct fhopen_args /* {
syscallarg(const struct fhandle *) u_fhp;
syscallarg(int) flags;
} */ *uap;
{
struct proc *p = td->td_proc;
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
struct fhandle fhp;
struct vattr vat;
struct vattr *vap = &vat;
struct flock lf;
struct file *fp;
register struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
int fmode, mode, error, type;
struct file *nfp;
int indx;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
fmode = FFLAGS(SCARG(uap, flags));
/* why not allow a non-read/write open for our lockd? */
if (((fmode & (FREAD | FWRITE)) == 0) || (fmode & O_CREAT))
return (EINVAL);
error = copyin(SCARG(uap,u_fhp), &fhp, sizeof(fhp));
if (error)
return(error);
/* find the mount point */
mp = vfs_getvfs(&fhp.fh_fsid);
if (mp == NULL)
return (ESTALE);
/* now give me my vnode, it gets returned to me locked */
error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fhp.fh_fid, &vp);
if (error)
return (error);
/*
* from now on we have to make sure not
* to forget about the vnode
* any error that causes an abort must vput(vp)
* just set error = err and 'goto bad;'.
*/
/*
* from vn_open
*/
if (vp->v_type == VLNK) {
error = EMLINK;
goto bad;
}
if (vp->v_type == VSOCK) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
goto bad;
}
mode = 0;
if (fmode & (FWRITE | O_TRUNC)) {
if (vp->v_type == VDIR) {
error = EISDIR;
goto bad;
}
error = vn_writechk(vp);
if (error)
goto bad;
mode |= VWRITE;
}
if (fmode & FREAD)
mode |= VREAD;
if (fmode & O_APPEND)
mode |= VAPPEND;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_open(td->td_ucred, vp, mode);
if (error)
goto bad;
#endif
if (mode) {
error = VOP_ACCESS(vp, mode, td->td_ucred, td);
if (error)
goto bad;
}
if (fmode & O_TRUNC) {
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td); /* XXX */
if ((error = vn_start_write(NULL, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0) {
vrele(vp);
return (error);
}
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td); /* XXX */
#ifdef MAC
/*
* We don't yet have fp->f_cred, so use td->td_ucred, which
* should be right.
*/
error = mac_check_vnode_write(td->td_ucred, td->td_ucred, vp);
if (error == 0) {
#endif
VATTR_NULL(vap);
vap->va_size = 0;
error = VOP_SETATTR(vp, vap, td->td_ucred, td);
#ifdef MAC
}
#endif
vn_finished_write(mp);
if (error)
goto bad;
}
error = VOP_OPEN(vp, fmode, td->td_ucred, td);
if (error)
goto bad;
/*
* Make sure that a VM object is created for VMIO support.
*/
if (vn_canvmio(vp) == TRUE) {
if ((error = vfs_object_create(vp, td, td->td_ucred)) != 0)
goto bad;
}
if (fmode & FWRITE)
vp->v_writecount++;
/*
* end of vn_open code
*/
if ((error = falloc(td, &nfp, &indx)) != 0) {
if (fmode & FWRITE)
vp->v_writecount--;
goto bad;
}
fp = nfp;
/*
* Hold an extra reference to avoid having fp ripped out
* from under us while we block in the lock op
*/
fhold(fp);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
nfp->f_data = vp;
nfp->f_flag = fmode & FMASK;
nfp->f_ops = &vnops;
nfp->f_type = DTYPE_VNODE;
if (fmode & (O_EXLOCK | O_SHLOCK)) {
lf.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
lf.l_start = 0;
lf.l_len = 0;
if (fmode & O_EXLOCK)
lf.l_type = F_WRLCK;
else
lf.l_type = F_RDLCK;
type = F_FLOCK;
if ((fmode & FNONBLOCK) == 0)
type |= F_WAIT;
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
if ((error = VOP_ADVLOCK(vp, (caddr_t)fp, F_SETLK, &lf,
type)) != 0) {
/*
* The lock request failed. Normally close the
* descriptor but handle the case where someone might
* have dup()d or close()d it when we weren't looking.
*/
FILEDESC_LOCK(fdp);
if (fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] == fp) {
fdp->fd_ofiles[indx] = NULL;
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
fdrop(fp, td);
} else
FILEDESC_UNLOCK(fdp);
/*
* release our private reference
*/
fdrop(fp, td);
return(error);
}
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
fp->f_flag |= FHASLOCK;
}
if ((vp->v_type == VREG) && (VOP_GETVOBJECT(vp, NULL) != 0))
vfs_object_create(vp, td, td->td_ucred);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
td->td_retval[0] = indx;
return (0);
bad:
vput(vp);
return (error);
}
/*
* Stat an (NFS) file handle.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct fhstat_args {
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
struct stat *sb;
};
#endif
int
fhstat(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
register struct fhstat_args /* {
syscallarg(struct fhandle *) u_fhp;
syscallarg(struct stat *) sb;
} */ *uap;
{
struct stat sb;
fhandle_t fh;
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
int error;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
error = copyin(SCARG(uap, u_fhp), &fh, sizeof(fhandle_t));
if (error)
return (error);
if ((mp = vfs_getvfs(&fh.fh_fsid)) == NULL)
return (ESTALE);
if ((error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fh.fh_fid, &vp)))
return (error);
Make similar changes to fo_stat() and fo_poll() as made earlier to fo_read() and fo_write(): explicitly use the cred argument to fo_poll() as "active_cred" using the passed file descriptor's f_cred reference to provide access to the file credential. Add an active_cred argument to fo_stat() so that implementers have access to the active credential as well as the file credential. Generally modify callers of fo_stat() to pass in td->td_ucred rather than fp->f_cred, which was redundantly provided via the fp argument. This set of modifications also permits threads to perform these operations on behalf of another thread without modifying their credential. Trickle this change down into fo_stat/poll() implementations: - badfo_poll(), badfo_stat(): modify/add arguments. - kqueue_poll(), kqueue_stat(): modify arguments. - pipe_poll(), pipe_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass active_cred to MAC checks rather than td->td_ucred. - soo_poll(), soo_stat(): modify/add arguments, pass fp->f_cred rather than cred to pru_sopoll() to maintain current semantics. - sopoll(): moidfy arguments. - vn_poll(), vn_statfile(): modify/add arguments, pass new arguments to vn_stat(). Pass active_cred to MAC and fp->f_cred to VOP_POLL() to maintian current semantics. - vn_close(): rename cred to file_cred to reflect reality while I'm here. - vn_stat(): Add active_cred and file_cred arguments to vn_stat() and consumers so that this distinction is maintained at the VFS as well as 'struct file' layer. Pass active_cred instead of td->td_ucred to MAC and to VOP_GETATTR() to maintain current semantics. - fifofs: modify the creation of a "filetemp" so that the file credential is properly initialized and can be used in the socket code if desired. Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active credential to soo_poll(). If we teach the vnop interface about the distinction between file and active credentials, we would use the active credential here. Note that current inconsistent passing of active_cred vs. file_cred to VOP's is maintained. It's not clear why GETATTR would be authorized using active_cred while POLL would be authorized using file_cred at the file system level. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-16 13:52:03 +01:00
error = vn_stat(vp, &sb, td->td_ucred, NOCRED, td);
vput(vp);
if (error)
return (error);
error = copyout(&sb, SCARG(uap, sb), sizeof(sb));
return (error);
}
/*
* Implement fstatfs() for (NFS) file handles.
*/
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct fhstatfs_args {
struct fhandle *u_fhp;
struct statfs *buf;
};
#endif
int
fhstatfs(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct fhstatfs_args /* {
syscallarg(struct fhandle) *u_fhp;
syscallarg(struct statfs) *buf;
} */ *uap;
{
struct statfs *sp;
struct mount *mp;
struct vnode *vp;
struct statfs sb;
fhandle_t fh;
int error;
/*
* Must be super user
*/
error = suser(td);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((error = copyin(SCARG(uap, u_fhp), &fh, sizeof(fhandle_t))) != 0)
return (error);
if ((mp = vfs_getvfs(&fh.fh_fsid)) == NULL)
return (ESTALE);
if ((error = VFS_FHTOVP(mp, &fh.fh_fid, &vp)))
return (error);
mp = vp->v_mount;
sp = &mp->mnt_stat;
vput(vp);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_mount_stat(td->td_ucred, mp);
if (error)
return (error);
#endif
if ((error = VFS_STATFS(mp, sp, td)) != 0)
return (error);
sp->f_flags = mp->mnt_flag & MNT_VISFLAGMASK;
if (suser(td)) {
2002-06-29 00:02:38 +01:00
bcopy(sp, &sb, sizeof(sb));
sb.f_fsid.val[0] = sb.f_fsid.val[1] = 0;
sp = &sb;
}
return (copyout(sp, SCARG(uap, buf), sizeof(*sp)));
}
/*
* Syscall to push extended attribute configuration information into the
* VFS. Accepts a path, which it converts to a mountpoint, as well as
* a command (int cmd), and attribute name and misc data. For now, the
* attribute name is left in userspace for consumption by the VFS_op.
* It will probably be changed to be copied into sysspace by the
* syscall in the future, once issues with various consumers of the
* attribute code have raised their hands.
*
* Currently this is used only by UFS Extended Attributes.
*/
int
extattrctl(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattrctl_args /* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) cmd;
syscallarg(const char *) filename;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
} */ *uap;
{
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
struct vnode *filename_vp;
struct nameidata nd;
struct mount *mp, *mp_writable;
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
/*
* uap->attrname is not always defined. We check again later when we
* invoke the VFS call so as to pass in NULL there if needed.
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
*/
if (uap->attrname != NULL) {
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN,
NULL);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
if (error)
return (error);
}
/*
* uap->filename is not always defined. If it is, grab a vnode lock,
* which VFS_EXTATTRCTL() will later release.
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
*/
filename_vp = NULL;
if (uap->filename != NULL) {
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW | LOCKLEAF, UIO_USERSPACE,
uap->filename, td);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
filename_vp = nd.ni_vp;
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_NO_VP_RELE | NDF_NO_VP_UNLOCK);
}
/* uap->path is always defined. */
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0) {
if (filename_vp != NULL)
vput(filename_vp);
return (error);
}
mp = nd.ni_vp->v_mount;
error = vn_start_write(nd.ni_vp, &mp_writable, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
NDFREE(&nd, 0);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
if (error) {
if (filename_vp != NULL)
vput(filename_vp);
return (error);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
}
error = VFS_EXTATTRCTL(mp, uap->cmd, filename_vp, uap->attrnamespace,
uap->attrname != NULL ? attrname : NULL, td);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
vn_finished_write(mp_writable);
o Change the API and ABI of the Extended Attribute kernel interfaces to introduce a new argument, "namespace", rather than relying on a first- character namespace indicator. This is in line with more recent thinking on EA interfaces on various mailing lists, including the posix1e, Linux acl-devel, and trustedbsd-discuss forums. Two namespaces are defined by default, EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM and EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_USER, where the primary distinction lies in the access control model: user EAs are accessible based on the normal MAC and DAC file/directory protections, and system attributes are limited to kernel-originated or appropriately privileged userland requests. o These API changes occur at several levels: the namespace argument is introduced in the extattr_{get,set}_file() system call interfaces, at the vnode operation level in the vop_{get,set}extattr() interfaces, and in the UFS extended attribute implementation. Changes are also introduced in the VFS extattrctl() interface (system call, VFS, and UFS implementation), where the arguments are modified to include a namespace field, as well as modified to advoid direct access to userspace variables from below the VFS layer (in the style of recent changes to mount by adrian@FreeBSD.org). This required some cleanup and bug fixing regarding VFS locks and the VFS interface, as a vnode pointer may now be optionally submitted to the VFS_EXTATTRCTL() call. Updated documentation for the VFS interface will be committed shortly. o In the near future, the auto-starting feature will be updated to search two sub-directories to the ".attribute" directory in appropriate file systems: "user" and "system" to locate attributes intended for those namespaces, as the single filename is no longer sufficient to indicate what namespace the attribute is intended for. Until this is committed, all attributes auto-started by UFS will be placed in the EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM namespace. o The default POSIX.1e attribute names for ACLs and Capabilities have been updated to no longer include the '$' in their filename. As such, if you're using these features, you'll need to rename the attribute backing files to the same names without '$' symbols in front. o Note that these changes will require changes in userland, which will be committed shortly. These include modifications to the extended attribute utilities, as well as to libutil for new namespace string conversion routines. Once the matching userland changes are committed, a buildworld is recommended to update all the necessary include files and verify that the kernel and userland environments are in sync. Note: If you do not use extended attributes (most people won't), upgrading is not imperative although since the system call API has changed, the new userland extended attribute code will no longer compile with old include files. o Couple of minor cleanups while I'm there: make more code compilation conditional on FFS_EXTATTR, which should recover a bit of space on kernels running without EA's, as well as update copyright dates. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2001-03-15 02:54:29 +00:00
/*
* VFS_EXTATTRCTL will have unlocked, but not de-ref'd,
* filename_vp, so vrele it if it is defined.
*/
if (filename_vp != NULL)
vrele(filename_vp);
return (error);
}
/*-
* Set a named extended attribute on a file or directory
*
* Arguments: unlocked vnode "vp", attribute namespace "attrnamespace",
* kernelspace string pointer "attrname", userspace buffer
* pointer "data", buffer length "nbytes", thread "td".
* Returns: 0 on success, an error number otherwise
* Locks: none
* References: vp must be a valid reference for the duration of the call
*/
static int
extattr_set_vp(struct vnode *vp, int attrnamespace, const char *attrname,
void *data, size_t nbytes, struct thread *td)
{
struct mount *mp;
struct uio auio;
struct iovec aiov;
ssize_t cnt;
int error;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
aiov.iov_base = data;
aiov.iov_len = nbytes;
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_offset = 0;
if (nbytes > INT_MAX) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
auio.uio_resid = nbytes;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_WRITE;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_td = td;
cnt = nbytes;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setextattr(td->td_ucred, vp, attrnamespace,
attrname, &auio);
if (error)
goto done;
#endif
error = VOP_SETEXTATTR(vp, attrnamespace, attrname, &auio,
td->td_ucred, td);
cnt -= auio.uio_resid;
td->td_retval[0] = cnt;
done:
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return (error);
}
int
extattr_set_file(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_set_file_args /* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
syscallarg(void *) data;
syscallarg(size_t) nbytes;
} */ *uap;
{
struct nameidata nd;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = extattr_set_vp(nd.ni_vp, uap->attrnamespace, attrname,
uap->data, uap->nbytes, td);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return (error);
}
int
extattr_set_fd(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_set_fd_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
syscallarg(void *) data;
syscallarg(size_t) nbytes;
} */ *uap;
{
struct file *fp;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = extattr_set_vp((struct vnode *)fp->f_data, uap->attrnamespace,
attrname, uap->data, uap->nbytes, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*-
* Get a named extended attribute on a file or directory
*
* Arguments: unlocked vnode "vp", attribute namespace "attrnamespace",
* kernelspace string pointer "attrname", userspace buffer
* pointer "data", buffer length "nbytes", thread "td".
* Returns: 0 on success, an error number otherwise
* Locks: none
* References: vp must be a valid reference for the duration of the call
*/
static int
extattr_get_vp(struct vnode *vp, int attrnamespace, const char *attrname,
void *data, size_t nbytes, struct thread *td)
{
struct uio auio, *auiop;
struct iovec aiov;
ssize_t cnt;
size_t size, *sizep;
int error;
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_READ);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
/*
* Slightly unusual semantics: if the user provides a NULL data
* pointer, they don't want to receive the data, just the
* maximum read length.
*/
auiop = NULL;
sizep = NULL;
cnt = 0;
if (data != NULL) {
aiov.iov_base = data;
aiov.iov_len = nbytes;
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_offset = 0;
if (nbytes > INT_MAX) {
error = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
auio.uio_resid = nbytes;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_td = td;
auiop = &auio;
cnt = nbytes;
} else
sizep = &size;
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_getextattr(td->td_ucred, vp, attrnamespace,
attrname, &auio);
if (error)
goto done;
#endif
error = VOP_GETEXTATTR(vp, attrnamespace, attrname, auiop, sizep,
td->td_ucred, td);
if (auiop != NULL) {
cnt -= auio.uio_resid;
td->td_retval[0] = cnt;
} else
td->td_retval[0] = size;
done:
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
return (error);
}
int
extattr_get_file(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_get_file_args /* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
syscallarg(void *) data;
syscallarg(size_t) nbytes;
} */ *uap;
{
struct nameidata nd;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return (error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = extattr_get_vp(nd.ni_vp, uap->attrnamespace, attrname,
uap->data, uap->nbytes, td);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return (error);
}
int
extattr_get_fd(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_get_fd_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
syscallarg(void *) data;
syscallarg(size_t) nbytes;
} */ *uap;
{
struct file *fp;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
error = extattr_get_vp((struct vnode *)fp->f_data, uap->attrnamespace,
attrname, uap->data, uap->nbytes, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}
/*
* extattr_delete_vp(): Delete a named extended attribute on a file or
* directory
*
* Arguments: unlocked vnode "vp", attribute namespace "attrnamespace",
* kernelspace string pointer "attrname", proc "p"
* Returns: 0 on success, an error number otherwise
* Locks: none
* References: vp must be a valid reference for the duration of the call
*/
static int
extattr_delete_vp(struct vnode *vp, int attrnamespace, const char *attrname,
struct thread *td)
{
struct mount *mp;
int error;
if ((error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH)) != 0)
return (error);
VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
error = mac_check_vnode_setextattr(td->td_ucred, vp, attrnamespace,
attrname, NULL);
#endif
error = VOP_SETEXTATTR(vp, attrnamespace, attrname, NULL, td->td_ucred,
td);
VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
vn_finished_write(mp);
return (error);
}
int
extattr_delete_file(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_delete_file_args /* {
syscallarg(const char *) path;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
} */ *uap;
{
struct nameidata nd;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return(error);
NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
if ((error = namei(&nd)) != 0)
return(error);
NDFREE(&nd, NDF_ONLY_PNBUF);
error = extattr_delete_vp(nd.ni_vp, uap->attrnamespace, attrname, td);
vrele(nd.ni_vp);
return(error);
}
int
extattr_delete_fd(td, uap)
struct thread *td;
struct extattr_delete_fd_args /* {
syscallarg(int) fd;
syscallarg(int) attrnamespace;
syscallarg(const char *) attrname;
} */ *uap;
{
struct file *fp;
struct vnode *vp;
char attrname[EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN];
int error;
error = copyinstr(uap->attrname, attrname, EXTATTR_MAXNAMELEN, NULL);
if (error)
return (error);
if ((error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->fd, &fp)) != 0)
return (error);
vp = (struct vnode *)fp->f_data;
error = extattr_delete_vp(vp, uap->attrnamespace, attrname, td);
fdrop(fp, td);
return (error);
}