mirror of
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Merge OpenSSL 1.0.1q.
This commit is contained in:
Jung-uk Kim
parent
ba42458a50
commit
2825c95787
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/stable/10/; revision=291721
@ -2,6 +2,45 @@
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OpenSSL CHANGES
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_______________
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Changes between 1.0.1p and 1.0.1q [3 Dec 2015]
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*) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
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The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
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dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
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algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
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routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
|
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used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
|
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DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
|
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vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
|
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authentication.
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
|
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(CVE-2015-3194)
|
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[Stephen Henson]
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|
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*) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
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|
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When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
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memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
|
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application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
|
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affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
|
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|
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
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libFuzzer.
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(CVE-2015-3195)
|
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[Stephen Henson]
|
||||
|
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*) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
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This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
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though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
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legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
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return an error
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[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
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Changes between 1.0.1o and 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
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*) Alternate chains certificate forgery
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@ -15,10 +54,19 @@
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|
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
|
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(Google/BoringSSL).
|
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(CVE-2015-1793)
|
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[Matt Caswell]
|
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Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
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*) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
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If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
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the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
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result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
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identify hint data.
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(CVE-2015-3196)
|
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[Stephen Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
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*) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
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incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been
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restored.
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@ -55,9 +103,9 @@
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callbacks.
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|
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
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independently by Hanno Böck.
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independently by Hanno Böck.
|
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(CVE-2015-1789)
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
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|
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*) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
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|
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@ -71,7 +119,7 @@
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|
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
|
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(CVE-2015-1790)
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
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|
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*) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
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@ -94,6 +142,9 @@
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*) Reject DH handshakes with parameters shorter than 768 bits.
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[Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
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*) dhparam: generate 2048-bit parameters by default.
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[Kurt Roeckx and Emilia Kasper]
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|
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Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.1m [19 Mar 2015]
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*) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix
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@ -132,7 +183,7 @@
|
||||
|
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
|
||||
(CVE-2015-0289)
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper]
|
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|
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*) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
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@ -140,10 +191,10 @@
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servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
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a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
|
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|
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This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
|
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This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
|
||||
(OpenSSL development team).
|
||||
(CVE-2015-0293)
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper]
|
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|
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*) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix
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|
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@ -288,12 +339,12 @@
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version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
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version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
|
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sanity and breaks all known clients.
|
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[David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
|
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[David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
|
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|
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*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
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early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
|
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renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
|
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*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
|
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ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
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@ -304,7 +355,7 @@
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Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
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was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
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ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
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[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
|
||||
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
|
||||
|
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@ -384,10 +435,10 @@
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with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
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ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
|
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|
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Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
|
||||
Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
|
||||
issue.
|
||||
(CVE-2014-3510)
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper]
|
||||
|
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*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
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to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
|
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@ -424,7 +475,7 @@
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properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
|
||||
Denial of Service attack.
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|
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Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
|
||||
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
|
||||
discovering and researching this issue.
|
||||
(CVE-2014-5139)
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
@ -436,7 +487,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
|
||||
(CVE-2014-3508)
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
|
||||
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
|
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@ -466,15 +517,15 @@
|
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client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
|
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code on a vulnerable client or server.
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||||
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
|
||||
[Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
|
||||
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
|
||||
[Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
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||||
are subject to a denial of service attack.
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
|
||||
Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
|
||||
this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
|
||||
[Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
|
||||
[Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
|
||||
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*) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
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compilation flags.
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@ -553,9 +604,9 @@
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Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
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||||
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
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||||
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
|
||||
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
|
||||
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
|
||||
(CVE-2013-0169)
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
|
||||
ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
|
||||
@ -730,7 +781,7 @@
|
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EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
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||||
EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
|
||||
implementations).
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
|
||||
all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
|
||||
@ -1006,7 +1057,7 @@
|
||||
[Adam Langley (Google)]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
|
||||
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
|
||||
@ -1020,7 +1071,7 @@
|
||||
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
|
||||
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
|
||||
the last update always remained unused).
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
|
||||
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
|
||||
|
||||
*) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
|
||||
[Bob Buckholz (Google)]
|
||||
@ -1829,7 +1880,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
|
||||
and response verification functionality.
|
||||
[Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
|
||||
[Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
|
||||
extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
|
||||
@ -2997,7 +3048,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
*) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
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||||
initialised value as BN_new().
|
||||
[Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
@ -3016,7 +3067,7 @@
|
||||
some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
|
||||
maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
|
||||
in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
|
||||
[Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
|
||||
that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
|
||||
@ -3083,7 +3134,7 @@
|
||||
[Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
|
||||
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
|
||||
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
|
||||
control of the error stack.
|
||||
@ -3798,7 +3849,7 @@
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Undo Cygwin change.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
|
||||
Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
|
||||
@ -3831,11 +3882,11 @@
|
||||
[Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
|
||||
prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
|
||||
[Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
|
||||
[Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
@ -4297,7 +4348,7 @@
|
||||
pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
|
||||
the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
|
||||
data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
|
||||
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
|
||||
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
|
||||
[Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
|
||||
@ -6402,7 +6453,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) BN_sqr() bug fix.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
|
||||
so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
|
||||
@ -6562,7 +6613,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix OAEP check.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
|
||||
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
|
||||
@ -6824,10 +6875,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Use better test patterns in bntest.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
@ -6972,14 +7023,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
|
||||
BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
|
||||
[Bodo Möller]
|
||||
[Bodo Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add DSO method for VMS.
|
||||
[Richard Levitte]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
|
||||
wrong sign.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
|
||||
packages. The default package contains applications, application
|
||||
@ -6997,7 +7048,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
|
||||
random number < q in the DSA library.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
|
||||
behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
|
||||
@ -7263,7 +7314,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
*) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
|
||||
Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
|
||||
Random Numbers.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
|
||||
DSA key.
|
||||
@ -7483,7 +7534,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
|
||||
rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
|
||||
@ -7515,7 +7566,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
|
||||
RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
|
||||
@ -7604,7 +7655,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
|
||||
the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
|
||||
@ -7705,7 +7756,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
|
||||
[Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
|
||||
@ -7724,7 +7775,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
|
||||
case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
|
||||
assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
|
||||
@ -7754,14 +7805,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
|
||||
pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
|
||||
RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
|
||||
the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
|
||||
or -rand.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
|
||||
Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
|
||||
@ -7794,7 +7845,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
#define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
|
||||
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
|
||||
defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
|
||||
[Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
|
||||
[Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
|
||||
record layer.
|
||||
@ -7845,17 +7896,17 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
|
||||
bits.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
|
||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
|
||||
equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
|
||||
options to produce them.
|
||||
@ -7863,11 +7914,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
|
||||
get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
|
||||
for p == 0.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
|
||||
include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
|
||||
@ -7891,7 +7942,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
|
||||
use void * instead of char * in lhash.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
|
||||
(the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
|
||||
@ -7936,13 +7987,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
|
||||
bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
|
||||
SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
|
||||
the comments.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
|
||||
made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
|
||||
@ -7952,25 +8003,25 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
*) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
|
||||
by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
|
||||
to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
|
||||
used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
|
||||
BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
|
||||
BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
|
||||
Rabin-Miller iterations.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
|
||||
DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
|
||||
(Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
|
||||
"dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
|
||||
@ -8026,7 +8077,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
*) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
|
||||
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
|
||||
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
|
||||
[Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
|
||||
has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
|
||||
@ -8035,7 +8086,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
|
||||
RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
|
||||
(RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
|
||||
3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
|
||||
@ -8065,7 +8116,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
|
||||
unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
|
||||
@ -8899,7 +8950,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
|
||||
delete an unused file.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
|
||||
since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
|
||||
@ -8988,7 +9039,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
worked.
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
|
||||
RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
|
||||
@ -9105,7 +9156,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Ben Laurie]
|
||||
|
||||
*) DES library cleanups.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
|
||||
used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
|
||||
@ -9148,7 +9199,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
|
||||
File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
|
||||
@ -9261,7 +9312,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
|
||||
-Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
|
||||
@ -9318,10 +9369,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Ben Laurie]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support Borland C++ builder.
|
||||
[Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support Mingw32.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
|
||||
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
|
||||
@ -9330,7 +9381,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Update HPUX configuration.
|
||||
[Anonymous]
|
||||
@ -9363,7 +9414,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) OAEP decoding bug fix.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
|
||||
David Harris.
|
||||
@ -9386,21 +9437,21 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
|
||||
extension adding in x509 utility.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
|
||||
prototypes.
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
|
||||
by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
|
||||
@ -9429,7 +9480,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
|
||||
8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
|
||||
@ -9447,13 +9498,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Change functions to ANSI C.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix typos in error codes.
|
||||
[Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
|
||||
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
|
||||
@ -9490,7 +9541,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New Configure option "rsaref".
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
|
||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||
@ -9538,7 +9589,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
|
||||
the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Tweaks to Configure
|
||||
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
|
||||
@ -9548,11 +9599,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
|
||||
The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
|
||||
SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
|
||||
@ -10091,7 +10142,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
|
||||
functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
|
||||
@ -10101,7 +10152,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
[Steve Henson]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
|
||||
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
|
||||
[Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
|
||||
@ -10248,7 +10299,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
|
||||
|
||||
*) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
|
||||
was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
|
||||
[Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
[Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
|
||||
|
||||
*) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
|
||||
[Ben Laurie]
|
||||
|
||||
38
crypto/openssl/CONTRIBUTING
Normal file
38
crypto/openssl/CONTRIBUTING
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
||||
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
|
||||
----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
|
||||
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
|
||||
would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
|
||||
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
|
||||
textual explanation of what your patch does.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
|
||||
mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
|
||||
that we can more easily keep track of it.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
|
||||
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
|
||||
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
|
||||
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
|
||||
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
|
||||
(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
|
||||
warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
|
||||
platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
|
||||
|
||||
Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
|
||||
to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
|
||||
use the following command:
|
||||
|
||||
# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
|
||||
|
||||
Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
|
||||
follows:
|
||||
|
||||
# cd openssl-work
|
||||
# [your changes]
|
||||
# ./Configure dist; make clean
|
||||
# cd ..
|
||||
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
|
||||
@ -105,6 +105,8 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimenta
|
||||
|
||||
my $gcc_devteam_warn = "-Wall -pedantic -DPEDANTIC -Wno-long-long -Wsign-compare -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wformat -Werror -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT -DREF_CHECK -DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED";
|
||||
|
||||
my $clang_devteam_warn = "-Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Qunused-arguments";
|
||||
|
||||
my $strict_warnings = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
my $x86_gcc_des="DES_PTR DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL";
|
||||
@ -197,6 +199,7 @@ my %table=(
|
||||
"debug-linux-generic32","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
|
||||
"debug-linux-generic64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
|
||||
"debug-linux-x86_64","gcc:-DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
|
||||
"debug-linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
|
||||
"dist", "cc:-O::(unknown)::::::",
|
||||
|
||||
# Basic configs that should work on any (32 and less bit) box
|
||||
@ -361,6 +364,7 @@ my %table=(
|
||||
"linux-ia64-ecc","ecc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
|
||||
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall -no_cpprt::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
|
||||
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
|
||||
"linux-x86_64-clang","clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
|
||||
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
|
||||
#### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
|
||||
# "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
|
||||
@ -1574,11 +1578,20 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
|
||||
|
||||
if ($strict_warnings)
|
||||
{
|
||||
my $ecc = $cc;
|
||||
$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
|
||||
my $wopt;
|
||||
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc" unless ($cc =~ /gcc$/);
|
||||
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
|
||||
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
|
||||
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ($ecc eq "clang")
|
||||
{
|
||||
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
|
||||
{
|
||||
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
1041
crypto/openssl/FAQ
1041
crypto/openssl/FAQ
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
|
||||
## Makefile for OpenSSL
|
||||
##
|
||||
|
||||
VERSION=1.0.1p
|
||||
VERSION=1.0.1q
|
||||
MAJOR=1
|
||||
MINOR=0.1
|
||||
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
|
||||
@ -501,25 +501,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
|
||||
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
|
||||
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
|
||||
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
|
||||
tar:
|
||||
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
|
||||
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
|
||||
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
|
||||
-cvf -
|
||||
|
||||
../$(TARFILE).list:
|
||||
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
|
||||
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
|
||||
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
|
||||
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
|
||||
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
|
||||
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
|
||||
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
|
||||
find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
|
||||
$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
|
||||
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
|
||||
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
|
||||
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
|
||||
gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
|
||||
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
|
||||
|
||||
tar-snap:
|
||||
@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
|
||||
`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
|
||||
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
|
||||
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
|
||||
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
|
||||
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
|
||||
|
||||
dist:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -499,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
|
||||
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
|
||||
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
|
||||
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
|
||||
tar:
|
||||
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
|
||||
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
|
||||
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
|
||||
-cvf -
|
||||
|
||||
../$(TARFILE).list:
|
||||
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
|
||||
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
|
||||
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
|
||||
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
|
||||
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
|
||||
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
|
||||
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
|
||||
find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
|
||||
$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
|
||||
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
|
||||
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
|
||||
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
|
||||
gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
|
||||
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
|
||||
|
||||
tar-snap:
|
||||
@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
|
||||
`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
|
||||
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
|
||||
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
|
||||
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
|
||||
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
|
||||
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
|
||||
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
|
||||
|
||||
dist:
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5,9 +5,18 @@
|
||||
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
|
||||
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
|
||||
|
||||
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1p and OpenSSL 1.0.1q [3 Dec 2015]
|
||||
|
||||
o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
|
||||
o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
|
||||
o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
|
||||
o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
|
||||
return an error
|
||||
|
||||
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1o and OpenSSL 1.0.1p [9 Jul 2015]
|
||||
|
||||
o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
|
||||
o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
|
||||
|
||||
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1n and OpenSSL 1.0.1o [12 Jun 2015]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
OpenSSL 1.0.1p 9 Jul 2015
|
||||
OpenSSL 1.0.1q 3 Dec 2015
|
||||
|
||||
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
|
||||
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
|
||||
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
|
||||
All rights reserved.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -10,17 +10,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
|
||||
commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
|
||||
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
|
||||
protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
|
||||
The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
|
||||
Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its
|
||||
related documentation.
|
||||
Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as
|
||||
well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is
|
||||
managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to
|
||||
communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related
|
||||
documentation.
|
||||
|
||||
OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young
|
||||
OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
|
||||
and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
|
||||
OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means
|
||||
that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial
|
||||
purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
|
||||
OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
|
||||
get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
|
||||
fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
|
||||
|
||||
OVERVIEW
|
||||
--------
|
||||
@ -28,116 +28,39 @@
|
||||
The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
|
||||
|
||||
libssl.a:
|
||||
Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support
|
||||
both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client.
|
||||
Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.
|
||||
|
||||
libcrypto.a:
|
||||
General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not
|
||||
actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following:
|
||||
|
||||
Ciphers
|
||||
libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating
|
||||
around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by
|
||||
him as part of SSLeay. It includes 15 'modes/variations'
|
||||
of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb;
|
||||
pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx
|
||||
in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read
|
||||
passwords from the keyboard.
|
||||
RC4 encryption,
|
||||
RC2 encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
|
||||
Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
|
||||
IDEA encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
|
||||
|
||||
Digests
|
||||
MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations,
|
||||
SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms,
|
||||
MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards.
|
||||
|
||||
Public Key
|
||||
RSA encryption/decryption/generation.
|
||||
There is no limit on the number of bits.
|
||||
DSA encryption/decryption/generation.
|
||||
There is no limit on the number of bits.
|
||||
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation.
|
||||
There is no limit on the number of bits.
|
||||
|
||||
X.509v3 certificates
|
||||
X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM
|
||||
based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a
|
||||
private key. Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate
|
||||
requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates.
|
||||
|
||||
Systems
|
||||
The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding. Higher
|
||||
level access to ciphers and digests by name. New ciphers can be
|
||||
loaded at run time. The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking
|
||||
IO abstraction. Current methods supported are file descriptors,
|
||||
sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL
|
||||
client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing
|
||||
and null.
|
||||
|
||||
Data structures
|
||||
A dynamically growing hashing system
|
||||
A simple stack.
|
||||
A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files.
|
||||
Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
|
||||
not logically part of it.
|
||||
|
||||
openssl:
|
||||
A command line tool that can be used for:
|
||||
Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
|
||||
Creation of key parameters
|
||||
Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
|
||||
Calculation of Message Digests
|
||||
Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
|
||||
SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
|
||||
Calculation of message digests
|
||||
Encryption and decryption
|
||||
SSL/TLS client and server tests
|
||||
Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
PATENTS
|
||||
-------
|
||||
|
||||
Various companies hold various patents for various algorithms in various
|
||||
locations around the world. _YOU_ are responsible for ensuring that your use
|
||||
of any algorithms is legal by checking if there are any patents in your
|
||||
country. The file contains some of the patents that we know about or are
|
||||
rumored to exist. This is not a definitive list.
|
||||
|
||||
RSA Security holds software patents on the RC5 algorithm. If you
|
||||
intend to use this cipher, you must contact RSA Security for
|
||||
licensing conditions. Their web page is http://www.rsasecurity.com/.
|
||||
|
||||
RC4 is a trademark of RSA Security, so use of this label should perhaps
|
||||
only be used with RSA Security's permission.
|
||||
|
||||
The IDEA algorithm is patented by Ascom in Austria, France, Germany, Italy,
|
||||
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. They
|
||||
should be contacted if that algorithm is to be used; their web page is
|
||||
http://www.ascom.ch/.
|
||||
|
||||
NTT and Mitsubishi have patents and pending patents on the Camellia
|
||||
algorithm, but allow use at no charge without requiring an explicit
|
||||
licensing agreement: http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html
|
||||
And more...
|
||||
|
||||
INSTALLATION
|
||||
------------
|
||||
|
||||
To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file. For
|
||||
a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file. For OpenVMS systems, read
|
||||
INSTALL.VMS.
|
||||
|
||||
Read the documentation in the doc/ directory. It is quite rough, but it
|
||||
lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out
|
||||
how to use them. Look at the example programs.
|
||||
|
||||
PROBLEMS
|
||||
--------
|
||||
|
||||
For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user
|
||||
or application author. We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current
|
||||
thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL.
|
||||
See the appropriate file:
|
||||
INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc.
|
||||
INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP
|
||||
INSTALL.NW Netware
|
||||
INSTALL.OS2 OS/2
|
||||
INSTALL.VMS VMS
|
||||
INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit)
|
||||
INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit)
|
||||
INSTALL.WCE Windows CE
|
||||
|
||||
SUPPORT
|
||||
-------
|
||||
|
||||
See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain
|
||||
See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
|
||||
commercial technical support.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
|
||||
@ -161,58 +84,35 @@
|
||||
- Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known)
|
||||
- Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core)
|
||||
|
||||
Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker
|
||||
(http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to:
|
||||
Email the report to:
|
||||
|
||||
openssl-bugs@openssl.org
|
||||
rt@openssl.org
|
||||
|
||||
Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
|
||||
or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
|
||||
does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
|
||||
In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
|
||||
take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
|
||||
that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
|
||||
this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
|
||||
https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
|
||||
the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
|
||||
openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
|
||||
|
||||
Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the publicly
|
||||
readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public
|
||||
mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org
|
||||
(PGP key available from the key servers).
|
||||
Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
|
||||
Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
|
||||
is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
|
||||
|
||||
You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
|
||||
mail to rt@openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
|
||||
keep track of it.
|
||||
|
||||
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
|
||||
----------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
|
||||
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
|
||||
would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs@openssl.org with
|
||||
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
|
||||
textual explanation of what your patch does.
|
||||
See CONTRIBUTING
|
||||
|
||||
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
|
||||
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
|
||||
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
|
||||
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
|
||||
|
||||
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
|
||||
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
|
||||
OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
|
||||
can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
|
||||
compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
|
||||
features.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
|
||||
if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov
|
||||
(formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator;
|
||||
please take some time to look at
|
||||
http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic]
|
||||
and
|
||||
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e))
|
||||
for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as
|
||||
an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you
|
||||
have a cheap long-distance plan.
|
||||
|
||||
Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might
|
||||
generate it like this:
|
||||
|
||||
# cd openssl-work
|
||||
# [your changes]
|
||||
# ./Configure dist; make clean
|
||||
# cd ..
|
||||
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
|
||||
LEGALITIES
|
||||
----------
|
||||
|
||||
A number of nations, in particular the U.S., restrict the use or export
|
||||
of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions
|
||||
you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to
|
||||
develop or distribute cryptographic code.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
|
||||
depend: local_depend
|
||||
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
|
||||
local_depend:
|
||||
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
|
||||
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
|
||||
|
||||
dclean:
|
||||
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
|
||||
|
||||
@ -119,9 +119,6 @@
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
|
||||
# include <strings.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#include <sys/types.h>
|
||||
#include <ctype.h>
|
||||
#include <errno.h>
|
||||
@ -1247,7 +1244,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
|
||||
{"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
|
||||
{NULL, 0, 0}
|
||||
};
|
||||
return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
|
||||
if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
|
||||
*flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
|
||||
if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
|
||||
|| (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
|
||||
|| (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
|
||||
typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
|
||||
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -99,25 +99,19 @@
|
||||
#undef PROG
|
||||
#define PROG ca_main
|
||||
|
||||
#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
|
||||
#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
|
||||
#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
|
||||
#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
|
||||
|
||||
#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca"
|
||||
|
||||
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
|
||||
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
|
||||
#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
|
||||
|
||||
#define ENV_DIR "dir"
|
||||
#define ENV_CERTS "certs"
|
||||
#define ENV_CRL_DIR "crl_dir"
|
||||
#define ENV_CA_DB "CA_DB"
|
||||
#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir"
|
||||
#define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate"
|
||||
#define ENV_SERIAL "serial"
|
||||
#define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber"
|
||||
#define ENV_CRL "crl"
|
||||
#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key"
|
||||
#define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE"
|
||||
#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days"
|
||||
#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate"
|
||||
#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate"
|
||||
@ -2520,6 +2514,8 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
|
||||
char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
|
||||
|
||||
a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
|
||||
if (a_tm == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* get actual time and make a string */
|
||||
a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -413,14 +413,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (check) {
|
||||
if (group == NULL)
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
|
||||
if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
|
||||
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr)
|
||||
|
||||
static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int l = strlen(s);
|
||||
|
||||
if (*buf == NULL) {
|
||||
*size = step;
|
||||
*buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
|
||||
@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
|
||||
**buf = '\0';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (**buf != '\0')
|
||||
l += 2; /* ", " */
|
||||
|
||||
if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
|
||||
*size += step;
|
||||
*buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, char *path,
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) {
|
||||
BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
|
||||
if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
|
||||
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
|
||||
apps_startup();
|
||||
|
||||
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
||||
if (FIPS_mode())
|
||||
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
|
||||
else
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
|
||||
|
||||
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
|
||||
if (bio_err == NULL)
|
||||
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
||||
@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
||||
if (FIPS_mode())
|
||||
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
|
||||
else
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
|
||||
|
||||
args = argv + 1;
|
||||
|
||||
while (*args) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1884,6 +1884,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
|
||||
if (pass)
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(pass);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (vpm)
|
||||
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
|
||||
if (cbuf != NULL) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2654,6 +2654,21 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
||||
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
|
||||
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
|
||||
srp_callback_parm.user =
|
||||
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
|
||||
srp_callback_parm.login);
|
||||
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
|
||||
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
|
||||
else
|
||||
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
|
||||
delay(1000);
|
||||
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
|
||||
|
||||
60
crypto/openssl/appveyor.yml
Normal file
60
crypto/openssl/appveyor.yml
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
||||
platform:
|
||||
- x86
|
||||
- x64
|
||||
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
- VSVER: 9
|
||||
- VSVER: 10
|
||||
- VSVER: 11
|
||||
- VSVER: 12
|
||||
- VSVER: 14
|
||||
|
||||
configuration:
|
||||
- plain
|
||||
- shared
|
||||
|
||||
matrix:
|
||||
allow_failures:
|
||||
- platform: x64
|
||||
VSVER: 9
|
||||
- platform: x64
|
||||
VSVER: 10
|
||||
- platform: x64
|
||||
VSVER: 11
|
||||
|
||||
before_build:
|
||||
- ps: >-
|
||||
If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
|
||||
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
|
||||
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
|
||||
$env:DO="do_ms"
|
||||
} Else {
|
||||
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
|
||||
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
|
||||
$env:DO="do_win64a"
|
||||
}
|
||||
- ps: >-
|
||||
If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
|
||||
$env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
|
||||
} Else {
|
||||
$env:MAK="nt.mak"
|
||||
}
|
||||
- ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
|
||||
- call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
|
||||
- perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
|
||||
- call ms\%DO%
|
||||
|
||||
build_script:
|
||||
- nmake /f ms\%MAK%
|
||||
|
||||
test_script:
|
||||
- nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
|
||||
|
||||
notifications:
|
||||
- provider: Email
|
||||
to:
|
||||
- openssl-commits@openssl.org
|
||||
on_build_success: false
|
||||
on_build_failure: true
|
||||
on_build_status_changed: true
|
||||
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
|
||||
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
|
||||
# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
|
||||
# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
|
||||
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
|
||||
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
|
||||
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
|
||||
@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
|
||||
$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
|
||||
# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
|
||||
$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
|
||||
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
|
||||
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
|
||||
# I favor compact code to minimize cache
|
||||
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
|
||||
# in real-life applications...
|
||||
@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ sub enctransform()
|
||||
# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
|
||||
# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
|
||||
# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
|
||||
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
|
||||
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
|
||||
# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
|
||||
# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
|
||||
# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
|
||||
$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
|
||||
$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
|
||||
|
||||
# AESNI extenstion
|
||||
# AESNI extension
|
||||
sub aeskeygenassist
|
||||
{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
|
||||
if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
|
||||
#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
|
||||
int indent);
|
||||
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
|
||||
@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
|
||||
#else
|
||||
dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
|
||||
BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = *pp;
|
||||
tot = p + length;
|
||||
op = p - 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
|
||||
long length)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *ret;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
|
||||
if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
|
||||
@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
|
||||
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
|
||||
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
|
||||
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
|
||||
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
|
||||
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
|
||||
if (!p8)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
|
||||
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ret == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
*pp = p;
|
||||
if (a != NULL)
|
||||
(*a) = ret;
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
|
||||
* input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
|
||||
p = *pp;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
|
||||
* can just count the elements.
|
||||
@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
|
||||
keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
|
||||
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
|
||||
* traditional format */
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *ret;
|
||||
|
||||
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
|
||||
@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
|
||||
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
|
||||
if (ret == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
*pp = p;
|
||||
if (a) {
|
||||
*a = ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
|
||||
int otag;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
|
||||
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
|
||||
aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
|
||||
if (!pval)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
|
||||
@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
|
||||
goto auxerr;
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
|
||||
@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
|
||||
/* Save encoding */
|
||||
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
|
||||
goto auxerr;
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
|
||||
goto auxerr;
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
|
||||
auxerr:
|
||||
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
|
||||
err:
|
||||
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
|
||||
if (combine == 0)
|
||||
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
|
||||
if (errtt)
|
||||
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
|
||||
", Type=", it->sname);
|
||||
@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Nothing special */
|
||||
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
|
||||
-1, 0, opt, ctx);
|
||||
-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
|
||||
if (!ret) {
|
||||
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
|
||||
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *bn;
|
||||
if (!*pval)
|
||||
bn_new(pval, it);
|
||||
|
||||
if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
|
||||
if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
|
||||
bn_free(pval, it);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
|
||||
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
|
||||
const unsigned char *q;
|
||||
q = *pp;
|
||||
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
|
||||
if (!xpk)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
|
||||
X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
|
||||
if (!pktmp)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
*pp = q;
|
||||
if (a) {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
|
||||
*a = pktmp;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
|
||||
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
|
||||
freeret = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
|
||||
ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
|
||||
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
|
||||
if (!ret)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
/* update length */
|
||||
length -= *pp - q;
|
||||
if (!length)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
|
||||
length -= q - *pp;
|
||||
if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
*pp = q;
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (freeret) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
|
||||
if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
|
||||
rows++;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
|
||||
buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
|
||||
BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
|
||||
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
|
||||
BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
|
||||
static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIO *ret;
|
||||
FILE *file = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
|
||||
@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
|
||||
# else
|
||||
file = fopen(filename, mode);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
return (file);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIO *ret;
|
||||
FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
|
||||
|
||||
if (file == NULL) {
|
||||
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
|
||||
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
|
||||
@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
|
||||
else
|
||||
strcat(p, "t");
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
fp = fopen(ptr, p);
|
||||
fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
|
||||
if (fp == NULL) {
|
||||
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
|
||||
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ $code=<<___;
|
||||
.align 5
|
||||
mul_1x1_neon:
|
||||
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,d16,#8 @ q1-q3 are slided $a
|
||||
vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb
|
||||
vmull.p8 `&Q("d0")`,d16,d17 @ a·bb
|
||||
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,d16,#16
|
||||
vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb
|
||||
vmull.p8 q1,`&Dlo("q1")`,d17 @ a<<8·bb
|
||||
vshl.u64 `&Dlo("q3")`,d16,#24
|
||||
vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb
|
||||
vmull.p8 q2,`&Dlo("q2")`,d17 @ a<<16·bb
|
||||
vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q1")`,#8
|
||||
vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb
|
||||
vmull.p8 q3,`&Dlo("q3")`,d17 @ a<<24·bb
|
||||
vshl.u64 `&Dhi("q1")`,#24
|
||||
veor d0,`&Dlo("q1")`
|
||||
vshr.u64 `&Dlo("q2")`,#16
|
||||
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ ___
|
||||
################
|
||||
# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
|
||||
# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
|
||||
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
|
||||
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
|
||||
|
||||
($A1,$B1,$A0,$B0,$A1B1,$A0B0)=map("d$_",(18..23));
|
||||
|
||||
@ -184,20 +184,20 @@ bn_GF2m_mul_2x2:
|
||||
|
||||
vmov d16,$A1
|
||||
vmov d17,$B1
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a1·b1
|
||||
vmov $A1B1,d0
|
||||
|
||||
vmov d16,$A0
|
||||
vmov d17,$B0
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ a0·b0
|
||||
vmov $A0B0,d0
|
||||
|
||||
veor d16,$A0,$A1
|
||||
veor d17,$B0,$B1
|
||||
veor $A0,$A0B0,$A1B1
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_neon @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
|
||||
veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
|
||||
veor d0,$A0 @ (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
|
||||
vshl.u64 d1,d0,#32
|
||||
vshr.u64 d0,d0,#32
|
||||
veor $A0B0,d1
|
||||
@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
mov $mask,#7<<2
|
||||
sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
|
||||
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
|
||||
str $lo,[$ret,#8]
|
||||
str $hi,[$ret,#12]
|
||||
|
||||
@ -230,13 +230,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
eor r2,r2,$a
|
||||
eor $b,$b,r3
|
||||
eor $a,$a,r2
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
|
||||
str $lo,[$ret]
|
||||
str $hi,[$ret,#4]
|
||||
|
||||
eor $a,$a,r2
|
||||
eor $b,$b,r3
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
|
||||
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
|
||||
___
|
||||
@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
|
||||
|
||||
// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
|
||||
// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
|
||||
// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
|
||||
// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
|
||||
// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
|
||||
// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
|
||||
// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
|
||||
@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
|
||||
// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
|
||||
// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
|
||||
// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
|
||||
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
|
||||
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
|
||||
// highly appreciated.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on
|
||||
|
||||
@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
|
||||
if ($SIZE_T==8) {
|
||||
my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
|
||||
stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
|
||||
|
||||
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
|
||||
stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
|
||||
|
||||
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp)
|
||||
|
||||
xgr $lo,$hi
|
||||
|
||||
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
|
||||
# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
|
||||
# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
|
||||
# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
|
||||
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
|
||||
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
|
||||
# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
|
||||
# code:
|
||||
#
|
||||
@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
|
||||
&push ("edi");
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
|
||||
&movq ("mm7",$R);
|
||||
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
|
||||
&movq ("mm6",$R);
|
||||
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
|
||||
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
|
||||
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
&pxor ($R,"mm7");
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(0));
|
||||
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
|
||||
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
|
||||
|
||||
&movq ($A,$R);
|
||||
&psllq ($R,32);
|
||||
@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
|
||||
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
|
||||
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
|
||||
&mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
|
||||
|
||||
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
|
||||
&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
|
||||
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
|
||||
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
|
||||
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
|
||||
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
|
||||
&mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
|
||||
@r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
|
||||
# undef sqr
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
|
||||
* "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
|
||||
* "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it
|
||||
* want to keep the value of zero;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
|
||||
# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
|
||||
# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
|
||||
# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
|
||||
# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
|
||||
# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
|
||||
# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
|
||||
# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
|
||||
# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
|
||||
@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
|
||||
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
|
||||
pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
|
||||
pxor %xmm3,%xmm5
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
|
||||
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
xorps %xmm0,%xmm4
|
||||
xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
|
||||
xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
|
||||
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
|
||||
pslldq \$8,%xmm4
|
||||
psrldq \$8,%xmm5
|
||||
@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
mov \$0xf,$mask
|
||||
mov $a1,$a
|
||||
mov $b1,$b
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
|
||||
mov $lo,16(%rsp)
|
||||
mov $hi,24(%rsp)
|
||||
|
||||
mov 48(%rsp),$a
|
||||
mov 64(%rsp),$b
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
|
||||
mov $lo,0(%rsp)
|
||||
mov $hi,8(%rsp)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
|
||||
mov 56(%rsp),$b
|
||||
xor 48(%rsp),$a
|
||||
xor 64(%rsp),$b
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
|
||||
___
|
||||
@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
|
||||
$code.=<<___;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -599,12 +599,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
|
||||
bn_check_top(p);
|
||||
bn_check_top(m);
|
||||
|
||||
top = m->top;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
|
||||
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
|
||||
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
top = m->top;
|
||||
|
||||
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
|
||||
if (bits == 0) {
|
||||
ret = BN_one(rr);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
|
||||
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pB = &local_B;
|
||||
local_B.flags = 0;
|
||||
BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
|
||||
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pA = &local_A;
|
||||
local_A.flags = 0;
|
||||
BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
|
||||
bn_check_top(a);
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -700,18 +700,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
int top = p->top;
|
||||
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
|
||||
|
||||
bn_wexpand(u, top);
|
||||
if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
udp = u->d;
|
||||
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
|
||||
udp[i] = 0;
|
||||
u->top = top;
|
||||
bn_wexpand(b, top);
|
||||
if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
bdp = b->d;
|
||||
bdp[0] = 1;
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
|
||||
bdp[i] = 0;
|
||||
b->top = top;
|
||||
bn_wexpand(c, top);
|
||||
if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
cdp = c->d;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
|
||||
cdp[i] = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
|
||||
if (mont == NULL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_free(&(mont->RR));
|
||||
BN_free(&(mont->N));
|
||||
BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
|
||||
BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
|
||||
BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
|
||||
BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
|
||||
if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(mont);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_is_zero(mod))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
|
||||
BN_zero(d);
|
||||
if (!BN_copy(r, m))
|
||||
if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
* exceeded.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
|
||||
if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
|
||||
BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
|
||||
if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
|
||||
@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
||||
@ -441,6 +441,14 @@ int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
BN_init(&d);
|
||||
BN_init(&e);
|
||||
|
||||
BN_one(&a);
|
||||
BN_zero(&b);
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
|
||||
if (i < num1) {
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
|
||||
@ -516,9 +524,9 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
|
||||
do {
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
|
||||
s = b.d[0];
|
||||
} while (!s);
|
||||
} while (BN_is_zero(&b));
|
||||
|
||||
s = b.d[0];
|
||||
BN_copy(&b, &a);
|
||||
r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -781,6 +789,18 @@ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
if (mont == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_zero(&n);
|
||||
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_set_word(&n, 16);
|
||||
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
|
||||
@ -887,6 +907,14 @@ int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
d = BN_new();
|
||||
e = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
BN_one(a);
|
||||
BN_one(b);
|
||||
BN_zero(c);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
|
||||
@ -952,6 +980,14 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
d = BN_new();
|
||||
e = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
BN_one(a);
|
||||
BN_one(b);
|
||||
BN_zero(c);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
|
||||
@ -999,6 +1035,22 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
d = BN_new();
|
||||
e = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
BN_one(a);
|
||||
BN_one(b);
|
||||
BN_zero(c);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
|
||||
"succeeded\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_set_word(c, 16);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
|
||||
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
|
||||
"succeeded\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
|
||||
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -58,12 +58,13 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include "cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
||||
|
||||
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (str == NULL)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -72,14 +73,20 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
|
||||
char *ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (str == NULL)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (siz >= INT_MAX)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
|
||||
if (ret == NULL) {
|
||||
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(ret, str, siz);
|
||||
ret[siz] = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -87,13 +94,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
|
||||
{
|
||||
void *ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (data == NULL)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
|
||||
if (ret == NULL) {
|
||||
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -85,7 +85,13 @@ void BUF_MEM_free(BUF_MEM *a);
|
||||
int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
|
||||
int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
|
||||
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
|
||||
* first |siz| bytes of |str|.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
|
||||
|
||||
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
|
||||
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
|
||||
ok = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
|
||||
if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
|
||||
ec->key = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
|
||||
|
||||
/* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
|
||||
encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
||||
if (encalg == NULL) {
|
||||
goto merr;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
|
||||
BIO *cmsbio;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
|
||||
void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
|
||||
if (zlib_dso)
|
||||
if (zlib_dso != NULL)
|
||||
DSO_free(zlib_dso);
|
||||
zlib_dso = NULL;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
|
||||
section = BUF_strdup("default");
|
||||
if (section == NULL) {
|
||||
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
|
||||
|
||||
if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
|
||||
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
|
||||
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
|
||||
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
|
||||
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
|
||||
openssl_configured = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void OPENSSL_no_config()
|
||||
|
||||
@ -930,13 +930,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
|
||||
# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
|
||||
/* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
|
||||
if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
|
||||
HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
|
||||
const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
|
||||
ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
|
||||
DeregisterEventSource(h);
|
||||
HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
|
||||
|
||||
if (hEventLog != NULL) {
|
||||
const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
|
||||
1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
|
||||
#if defined(DEBUG)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
|
||||
* error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
|
||||
* in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
|
||||
* tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
OutputDebugString(pmsg);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
|
||||
MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
|
||||
prkey = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
|
||||
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))
|
||||
|
||||
@ -112,16 +112,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
|
||||
}
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
else {
|
||||
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
|
||||
size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
|
||||
|
||||
if (bits >= 2048) {
|
||||
qbits = 256;
|
||||
evpmd = EVP_sha256();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
qbits = 160;
|
||||
evpmd = EVP_sha1();
|
||||
}
|
||||
const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
|
||||
size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
|
||||
|
||||
return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
|
||||
seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
|
||||
@ -174,13 +166,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
|
||||
if (seed_in != NULL)
|
||||
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
@ -201,7 +194,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!seed_len) {
|
||||
if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
|
||||
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
seed_is_random = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum {
|
||||
/** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
|
||||
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
|
||||
POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
|
||||
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */
|
||||
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */
|
||||
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
|
||||
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
|
||||
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -970,8 +970,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
|
||||
ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p = *in;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
|
||||
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
|
||||
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
@ -989,6 +990,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
*a = group;
|
||||
|
||||
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
return (group);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
int ok = 0;
|
||||
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
|
||||
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
|
||||
const unsigned char *p = *in;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
|
||||
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1096,6 +1099,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
|
||||
|
||||
if (a)
|
||||
*a = ret;
|
||||
*in = p;
|
||||
ok = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (!ok) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
|
||||
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
|
||||
int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
|
||||
int ok = 0;
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
||||
int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
|
||||
@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
|
||||
if (!point)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
||||
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
|
||||
|
||||
if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
|
||||
is_char_two = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
|
||||
if (is_char_two) {
|
||||
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
|
||||
x, y, ctx))
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1230,15 +1230,18 @@ static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
|
||||
if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r,
|
||||
BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) {
|
||||
dsaret = DSA_SIG_new();
|
||||
if (dsaret == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
dsaret->r = r;
|
||||
dsaret->s = s;
|
||||
r = s = NULL;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
|
||||
BN_free(r);
|
||||
BN_free(s);
|
||||
dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa);
|
||||
}
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(r);
|
||||
BN_free(s);
|
||||
kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
|
||||
zapparams(&kop);
|
||||
return (dsaret);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
|
||||
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
|
||||
if (!engine_list_add(e)) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
|
||||
DES_cblock *deskey = (DES_cblock *)key;
|
||||
# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
|
||||
if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1)
|
||||
! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
|
||||
|| DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &data(ctx)->ks2))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
# else
|
||||
DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &data(ctx)->ks1);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -60,9 +60,9 @@
|
||||
#include "cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
|
||||
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
|
||||
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
|
||||
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
|
||||
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
|
||||
@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
|
||||
* as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
|
||||
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
|
||||
#define B64_WS 0xE0
|
||||
#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
|
||||
#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
|
||||
#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
|
||||
|
||||
static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
|
||||
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
||||
@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
|
||||
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
|
||||
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (a & 0x80)
|
||||
return B64_ERROR;
|
||||
return data_ascii2bin[a];
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
|
||||
{
|
||||
a = os_toascii[a];
|
||||
if (a & 0x80)
|
||||
return B64_ERROR;
|
||||
return data_ascii2bin[a];
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ctx->length = 48;
|
||||
@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
|
||||
|
||||
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ctx->length = 30;
|
||||
/* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
|
||||
ctx->num = 0;
|
||||
ctx->length = 0;
|
||||
ctx->line_num = 0;
|
||||
ctx->expect_nl = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
* -1 for error
|
||||
* 0 for last line
|
||||
* 1 for full line
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
|
||||
* content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
|
||||
* in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
|
||||
* rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
|
||||
* content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
|
||||
* we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
|
||||
* - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
|
||||
* - Input has zero-length.
|
||||
* -1 is returned if:
|
||||
* - Invalid characters are detected.
|
||||
* - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
|
||||
* - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
|
||||
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
|
||||
int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *d;
|
||||
|
||||
n = ctx->num;
|
||||
d = ctx->enc_data;
|
||||
ln = ctx->line_num;
|
||||
exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
|
||||
|
||||
/* last line of input. */
|
||||
if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
|
||||
if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
|
||||
eof++;
|
||||
if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
|
||||
eof++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
|
||||
if (inl == 0) {
|
||||
rv = 0;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We parse the input data */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
|
||||
/* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream alot */
|
||||
if (ln >= 80) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Get char and put it into the buffer */
|
||||
tmp = *(in++);
|
||||
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
|
||||
/* only save the good data :-) */
|
||||
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
|
||||
d[n++] = tmp;
|
||||
ln++;
|
||||
} else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
|
||||
if (v == B64_ERROR) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof
|
||||
* will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
|
||||
* many characters to chop off.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (tmp == '=') {
|
||||
if (seof == -1)
|
||||
seof = n;
|
||||
eof++;
|
||||
} else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
|
||||
/* More data after padding. */
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (v == B64_CR) {
|
||||
ln = 0;
|
||||
if (exp_nl)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (eof > 2) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* eoln */
|
||||
if (v == B64_EOLN) {
|
||||
ln = 0;
|
||||
if (exp_nl) {
|
||||
exp_nl = 0;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
exp_nl = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
|
||||
* it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
|
||||
v = B64_EOF;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* In case things were given us in really small records (so two
|
||||
* '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
|
||||
* incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
|
||||
* count
|
||||
*/
|
||||
eof = 0;
|
||||
if (d[n - 1] == '=')
|
||||
eof++;
|
||||
if (d[n - 2] == '=')
|
||||
eof++;
|
||||
/* There will never be more than two '=' */
|
||||
if (v == B64_EOF) {
|
||||
seof = 1;
|
||||
goto tail;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We
|
||||
* process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
|
||||
exp_nl = 1;
|
||||
if (n > 0) {
|
||||
v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
|
||||
n = 0;
|
||||
if (v < 0) {
|
||||
rv = 0;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (eof > v) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret += (v - eof);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
eof = 1;
|
||||
v = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
|
||||
* line
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
|
||||
rv = 0;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
ctx->length = v;
|
||||
|
||||
if (seof >= 0) {
|
||||
rv = 0;
|
||||
/* Only save valid base64 characters. */
|
||||
if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
|
||||
if (n >= 64) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
|
||||
* we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
|
||||
* manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
out += v;
|
||||
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
|
||||
d[n++] = tmp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (n == 64) {
|
||||
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
|
||||
n = 0;
|
||||
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret += decoded_len - eof;
|
||||
out += decoded_len - eof;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
end:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
|
||||
* 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
|
||||
* behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
tail:
|
||||
if (n > 0) {
|
||||
if ((n & 3) == 0) {
|
||||
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
|
||||
n = 0;
|
||||
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret += (decoded_len - eof);
|
||||
} else if (seof) {
|
||||
/* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
|
||||
rv = -1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
|
||||
end:
|
||||
/* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
|
||||
*outl = ret;
|
||||
ctx->num = n;
|
||||
ctx->line_num = ln;
|
||||
ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
|
||||
return (rv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
|
||||
if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
|
||||
prompt = prompt_string;
|
||||
ui = UI_new();
|
||||
if (ui == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
|
||||
(len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
|
||||
if (verify)
|
||||
@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (addmd++)
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
|
||||
rv = type->key_len;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -67,9 +67,19 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
|
||||
|
||||
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
|
||||
ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
|
||||
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
|
||||
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
|
||||
else
|
||||
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
|
||||
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -80,9 +90,20 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
|
||||
|
||||
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
|
||||
ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
|
||||
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1)
|
||||
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
|
||||
else
|
||||
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
|
||||
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
|
||||
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
|
||||
int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
|
||||
if (!pbe_algs)
|
||||
|
||||
if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
|
||||
pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
|
||||
if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (pbe_algs == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
|
||||
pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
|
||||
pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
|
||||
@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
|
||||
|
||||
sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,
|
||||
|
||||
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
|
||||
|
||||
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
|
||||
if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
|
||||
return (key != NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ppkey)
|
||||
if (ppkey == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!*ppkey)
|
||||
if (*ppkey == NULL)
|
||||
*ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (*ppkey == NULL) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
|
||||
if (ret <= 0) {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
|
||||
os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
|
||||
if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -218,6 +218,9 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
|
||||
BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL)
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
|
||||
|
||||
/* t1 = g^b */
|
||||
@ -233,6 +236,7 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
|
||||
else
|
||||
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
|
||||
|
||||
end:
|
||||
/* cleanup */
|
||||
BN_free(t3);
|
||||
BN_free(t2);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *p = ptr;
|
||||
size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ptr == NULL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
while (loop--) {
|
||||
*(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
|
||||
ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));
|
||||
|
||||
@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
|
||||
vdup.8 $xi,`&Dlo("$IN")`[0] @ broadcast lowest byte
|
||||
.Linner_neon:
|
||||
subs $cnt,$cnt,#1
|
||||
vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i]
|
||||
vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i]
|
||||
vmull.p8 $Qlo,$Hlo,$xi @ H.lo·Xi[i]
|
||||
vmull.p8 $Qhi,$Hhi,$xi @ H.hi·Xi[i]
|
||||
vext.8 $IN,$zero,#1 @ IN>>=8
|
||||
|
||||
veor $Z,$Qpost @ modulo-scheduled part
|
||||
@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
|
||||
vsli.8 $Zo,$T,#1 @ compose the "carry" byte
|
||||
vext.8 $Z,$zero,#1 @ Z>>=8
|
||||
|
||||
vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1
|
||||
vmull.p8 $R,$Zo,$mod @ "carry"·0xe1
|
||||
vshr.u8 $Zo,$T,#7 @ save Z's bottom bit
|
||||
vext.8 $Qpost,$Qlo,$zero,#1 @ Qlo>>=8
|
||||
veor $Z,$Qhi
|
||||
|
||||
@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
|
||||
# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
|
||||
# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
|
||||
# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
|
||||
# on contemporary µ-archs.
|
||||
# on contemporary µ-archs.
|
||||
{
|
||||
my $cnt;
|
||||
my $rem_4bit = "eax";
|
||||
|
||||
@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
|
||||
if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
|
||||
*p = 0;
|
||||
port = p + 1;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* Not found: set default port */
|
||||
if (*pssl)
|
||||
port = "443";
|
||||
else
|
||||
port = "80";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*pport = BUF_strdup(port);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
|
||||
if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
|
||||
if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
rd = br->tbsResponseData;
|
||||
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
|
||||
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
|
||||
#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
|
||||
# define DES_PTR
|
||||
# define DES_RISC1
|
||||
# define DES_UNROLL
|
||||
|
||||
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
|
||||
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
|
||||
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
|
||||
#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
|
||||
# define DES_PTR
|
||||
# define DES_RISC1
|
||||
# define DES_UNROLL
|
||||
|
||||
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
|
||||
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
|
||||
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000110fL
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000111fL
|
||||
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-fips 9 Jul 2015"
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-fips 3 Dec 2015"
|
||||
# else
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1p-freebsd 9 Jul 2015"
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.1q-freebsd 3 Dec 2015"
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
|
||||
xi->enc_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
|
||||
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ptype = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
|
||||
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
|
||||
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
|
||||
@ -193,6 +195,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
|
||||
xi->enc_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
|
||||
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ptype = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
|
||||
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
|
||||
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
|
||||
@ -214,6 +218,8 @@ STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(BIO *bp, STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *sk,
|
||||
xi->enc_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
xi->x_pkey = X509_PKEY_new();
|
||||
if (xi->x_pkey == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ptype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
|
||||
pp = &xi->x_pkey->dec_pkey;
|
||||
if ((int)strlen(header) > 10) /* assume encrypted */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -624,13 +624,11 @@ static int do_PVK_header(const unsigned char **in, unsigned int length,
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
length -= 20;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (length < 24) {
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
length -= 24;
|
||||
pvk_magic = read_ledword(&p);
|
||||
if (pvk_magic != MS_PVKMAGIC) {
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_MAGIC_NUMBER);
|
||||
@ -692,23 +690,23 @@ static EVP_PKEY *do_PVK_body(const unsigned char **in,
|
||||
inlen = PEM_def_callback(psbuf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u);
|
||||
if (inlen <= 0) {
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
enctmp = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen + 8);
|
||||
if (!enctmp) {
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!derive_pvk_key(keybuf, p, saltlen,
|
||||
(unsigned char *)psbuf, inlen))
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
p += saltlen;
|
||||
/* Copy BLOBHEADER across, decrypt rest */
|
||||
memcpy(enctmp, p, 8);
|
||||
p += 8;
|
||||
if (keylen < 8) {
|
||||
PEMerr(PEM_F_DO_PVK_BODY, PEM_R_PVK_TOO_SHORT);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
inlen = keylen - 8;
|
||||
q = enctmp + 8;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_item_pack_safebag(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
||||
bag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid1);
|
||||
if (!ASN1_item_pack(obj, it, &bag->value.octet)) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!(safebag = PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new())) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_ITEM_PACK_SAFEBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
safebag->value.bag = bag;
|
||||
safebag->type = OBJ_nid2obj(nid2);
|
||||
return safebag;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
PKCS12_BAGS_free(bag);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Turn PKCS8 object into a keybag */
|
||||
@ -127,6 +131,7 @@ PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG(int pbe_nid, const char *pass,
|
||||
PKCS8_encrypt(pbe_nid, pbe_ciph, pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter,
|
||||
p8))) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free(bag);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -144,14 +149,18 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7data(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *sk)
|
||||
p7->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data);
|
||||
if (!(p7->d.data = M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new())) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ASN1_item_pack(sk, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), &p7->d.data)) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7DATA, PKCS12_R_CANT_PACK_STRUCTURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return p7;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
PKCS7_free(p7);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Unpack SAFEBAGS from PKCS#7 data ContentInfo */
|
||||
@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||
if (!PKCS7_set_type(p7, NID_pkcs7_encrypted)) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA,
|
||||
PKCS12_R_ERROR_SETTING_ENCRYPTED_DATA_TYPE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pbe_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(pbe_nid);
|
||||
@ -193,7 +202,7 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pbe) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm);
|
||||
p7->d.encrypted->enc_data->algorithm = pbe;
|
||||
@ -202,10 +211,14 @@ PKCS7 *PKCS12_pack_p7encdata(int pbe_nid, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||
PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt(pbe, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS12_SAFEBAGS), pass,
|
||||
passlen, bags, 1))) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PACK_P7ENCDATA, PKCS12_R_ENCRYPT_ERROR);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return p7;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
PKCS7_free(p7);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) *PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(PKCS7 *p7, const char *pass,
|
||||
|
||||
@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ int PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *pbuf;
|
||||
unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
|
||||
|
||||
if (cipher == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Extract useful info from parameter */
|
||||
if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE ||
|
||||
param->value.sequence == NULL) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -173,11 +173,11 @@ int PKCS12_setup_mac(PKCS12 *p12, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!saltlen)
|
||||
saltlen = PKCS12_SALT_LEN;
|
||||
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
|
||||
if (!(p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen))) {
|
||||
if ((p12->mac->salt->data = OPENSSL_malloc(saltlen)) == NULL) {
|
||||
PKCS12err(PKCS12_F_PKCS12_SETUP_MAC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
p12->mac->salt->length = saltlen;
|
||||
if (!salt) {
|
||||
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p12->mac->salt->data, saltlen) < 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -656,6 +656,8 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
|
||||
bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(data_body->data, data_body->length);
|
||||
else {
|
||||
bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
||||
if (bio == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
BIO_set_mem_eof_return(bio, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (bio == NULL)
|
||||
@ -1156,7 +1158,6 @@ PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial(PKCS7 *p7, int idx)
|
||||
rsk = p7->d.signed_and_enveloped->recipientinfo;
|
||||
if (rsk == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, 0);
|
||||
if (sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk) <= idx)
|
||||
return (NULL);
|
||||
ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, idx);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
|
||||
# achieves respectful 432MBps on 2.8GHz processor now. For reference.
|
||||
# If executed on Xeon, current RC4_CHAR code-path is 2.7x faster than
|
||||
# RC4_INT code-path. While if executed on Opteron, it's only 25%
|
||||
# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection
|
||||
# slower than the RC4_INT one [meaning that if CPU µ-arch detection
|
||||
# is not implemented, then this final RC4_CHAR code-path should be
|
||||
# preferred, as it provides better *all-round* performance].
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
|
||||
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm) {
|
||||
ASN1_TYPE *param = pss->maskGenAlgorithm->parameter;
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(pss->maskGenAlgorithm->algorithm) == NID_mgf1
|
||||
&& param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
||||
&& param && param->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
|
||||
p = param->value.sequence->data;
|
||||
plen = param->value.sequence->length;
|
||||
*pmaskHash = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
||||
# include <openssl/fips.h>
|
||||
extern int FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e,
|
||||
BN_GENCB *cb);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
||||
if (FIPS_mode())
|
||||
return FIPS_rsa_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
return FIPS_rsa_x931_generate_key_ex(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -218,14 +218,13 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
|
||||
memcpy(rm, s + 2, 16);
|
||||
*prm_len = 16;
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
} else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16))
|
||||
} else if (memcmp(m, s + 2, 16)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Special case: SSL signature */
|
||||
if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (dtype == NID_md5_sha1) {
|
||||
/* Special case: SSL signature */
|
||||
if ((i != SSL_SIG_LENGTH) || memcmp(s, m, SSL_SIG_LENGTH))
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
else
|
||||
|
||||
@ -297,22 +297,30 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
} else
|
||||
printf("OAEP encryption/decryption ok\n");
|
||||
|
||||
/* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts */
|
||||
/* Try decrypting corrupted ciphertexts. */
|
||||
for (n = 0; n < clen; ++n) {
|
||||
int b;
|
||||
unsigned char saved = ctext[n];
|
||||
for (b = 0; b < 256; ++b) {
|
||||
if (b == saved)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
ctext[n] = b;
|
||||
num = RSA_private_decrypt(num, ctext, ptext, key,
|
||||
ctext[n] ^= 1;
|
||||
num = RSA_private_decrypt(clen, ctext, ptext, key,
|
||||
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
|
||||
if (num > 0) {
|
||||
printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
|
||||
err = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (num > 0) {
|
||||
printf("Corrupt data decrypted!\n");
|
||||
err = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctext[n] ^= 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Test truncated ciphertexts, as well as negative length. */
|
||||
for (n = -1; n < clen; ++n) {
|
||||
num = RSA_private_decrypt(n, ctext, ptext, key,
|
||||
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
|
||||
if (num > 0) {
|
||||
printf("Truncated data decrypted!\n");
|
||||
err = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
next:
|
||||
RSA_free(key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -66,9 +66,9 @@
|
||||
# switch to AVX alone improves performance by as little as 4% in
|
||||
# comparison to SSSE3 code path. But below result doesn't look like
|
||||
# 4% improvement... Trouble is that Sandy Bridge decodes 'ro[rl]' as
|
||||
# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
|
||||
# pair of µ-ops, and it's the additional µ-ops, two per round, that
|
||||
# make it run slower than Core2 and Westmere. But 'sh[rl]d' is decoded
|
||||
# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
|
||||
# as single µ-op by Sandy Bridge and it's replacing 'ro[rl]' with
|
||||
# equivalent 'sh[rl]d' that is responsible for the impressive 5.1
|
||||
# cycles per processed byte. But 'sh[rl]d' is not something that used
|
||||
# to be fast, nor does it appear to be fast in upcoming Bulldozer
|
||||
|
||||
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
|
||||
# purposes.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Performance improvement over compiler generated code varies from
|
||||
# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
|
||||
# 10% to 40% [see above]. Not very impressive on some µ-archs, but
|
||||
# it's 5 times smaller and optimizies amount of writes.
|
||||
|
||||
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
|
||||
#
|
||||
# IALU code-path is optimized for elder Pentiums. On vanilla Pentium
|
||||
# performance improvement over compiler generated code reaches ~60%,
|
||||
# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
|
||||
# while on PIII - ~35%. On newer µ-archs improvement varies from 15%
|
||||
# to 50%, but it's less important as they are expected to execute SSE2
|
||||
# code-path, which is commonly ~2-3x faster [than compiler generated
|
||||
# code]. SSE2 code-path is as fast as original sha512-sse2.pl, even
|
||||
|
||||
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
|
||||
# SHA512 performance is >2.9x better than gcc 3.2 generated code on
|
||||
# PA-7100LC, PA-RISC 1.1 processor. Then implementation detects if the
|
||||
# code is executed on PA-RISC 2.0 processor and switches to 64-bit
|
||||
# code path delivering adequate peformance even in "blended" 32-bit
|
||||
# code path delivering adequate performance even in "blended" 32-bit
|
||||
# build. Though 64-bit code is not any faster than code generated by
|
||||
# vendor compiler on PA-8600...
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
||||
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ OPENSSL_wipe_cpu:
|
||||
fmovs %f1,%f3
|
||||
fmovs %f0,%f2
|
||||
|
||||
add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack
|
||||
add %fp,BIAS,%i0 ! return pointer to caller´s top of stack
|
||||
|
||||
ret
|
||||
restore
|
||||
|
||||
@ -521,12 +521,12 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
|
||||
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
char *result = NULL;
|
||||
char *vf;
|
||||
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
|
||||
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
|
||||
char *defgNid = NULL;
|
||||
int vfsize = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((user == NULL) ||
|
||||
(pass == NULL) || (salt == NULL) || (verifier == NULL))
|
||||
@ -564,22 +564,23 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_bn2bin(v, tmp);
|
||||
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(BN_num_bytes(v) * 2)) == NULL))
|
||||
vfsize = BN_num_bytes(v) * 2;
|
||||
if (((vf = OPENSSL_malloc(vfsize)) == NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
t_tob64(vf, tmp, BN_num_bytes(v));
|
||||
|
||||
*verifier = vf;
|
||||
if (*salt == NULL) {
|
||||
char *tmp_salt;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((tmp_salt = OPENSSL_malloc(SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN * 2)) == NULL) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(vf);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
t_tob64(tmp_salt, tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN);
|
||||
*salt = tmp_salt;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
*verifier = vf;
|
||||
vf = NULL;
|
||||
result = defgNid;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
@ -587,11 +588,21 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
|
||||
BN_free(N_bn);
|
||||
BN_free(g_bn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(vf);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(s);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(v);
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs)
|
||||
* create a verifier (*salt,*verifier,g and N are BIGNUMs). If *salt != NULL
|
||||
* then the provided salt will be used. On successful exit *verifier will point
|
||||
* to a newly allocated BIGNUM containing the verifier and (if a salt was not
|
||||
* provided) *salt will be populated with a newly allocated BIGNUM containing a
|
||||
* random salt.
|
||||
* The caller is responsible for freeing the allocated *salt and *verifier
|
||||
* BIGNUMS.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
|
||||
BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
|
||||
@ -600,6 +611,7 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
|
||||
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
|
||||
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||||
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
|
||||
BIGNUM *salttmp = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((user == NULL) ||
|
||||
(pass == NULL) ||
|
||||
@ -614,10 +626,12 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
|
||||
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) < 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
*salt = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
|
||||
salttmp = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
salttmp = *salt;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
x = SRP_Calc_x(*salt, user, pass);
|
||||
x = SRP_Calc_x(salttmp, user, pass);
|
||||
|
||||
*verifier = BN_new();
|
||||
if (*verifier == NULL)
|
||||
@ -631,9 +645,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
|
||||
srp_bn_print(*verifier);
|
||||
|
||||
result = 1;
|
||||
*salt = salttmp;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
|
||||
if (*salt != salttmp)
|
||||
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(x);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
|
||||
return result;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int TS_check_status_info(TS_RESP *response)
|
||||
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(info->failure_info,
|
||||
TS_failure_info[i].code)) {
|
||||
if (!first)
|
||||
strcpy(failure_text, ",");
|
||||
strcat(failure_text, ",");
|
||||
else
|
||||
first = 0;
|
||||
strcat(failure_text, TS_failure_info[i].text);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
|
||||
# table]. I stick to value of 2 for two reasons: 1. smaller table
|
||||
# minimizes cache trashing and thus mitigates the hazard of side-
|
||||
# channel leakage similar to AES cache-timing one; 2. performance
|
||||
# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
|
||||
# gap among different µ-archs is smaller.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Performance table lists rounded amounts of CPU cycles spent by
|
||||
# whirlpool_block_mmx routine on single 64 byte input block, i.e.
|
||||
|
||||
@ -179,11 +179,24 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rv;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ensure hash is valid */
|
||||
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
|
||||
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
||||
if (rv)
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
|
||||
if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
|
||||
rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
|
||||
if (rv)
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
|
||||
a->cert_info->enc.len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@ -523,8 +523,6 @@ STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *X509_STORE_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
|
||||
X509_OBJECT *obj, xobj;
|
||||
sk = sk_X509_CRL_new_null();
|
||||
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
|
||||
/* Check cache first */
|
||||
idx = x509_object_idx_cnt(ctx->ctx->objs, X509_LU_CRL, nm, &cnt);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Always do lookup to possibly add new CRLs to cache
|
||||
|
||||
@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ static STACK_OF(POLICYINFO) *r2i_certpol(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
pol = POLICYINFO_new();
|
||||
if (pol == NULL) {
|
||||
X509V3err(X509V3_F_R2I_CERTPOL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
pol->policyid = pobj;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!sk_POLICYINFO_push(pols, pol)) {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -132,6 +132,8 @@ static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
|
||||
}
|
||||
tval.value = val->value;
|
||||
sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new();
|
||||
if (sub == NULL)
|
||||
goto memerr;
|
||||
if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!*ptree)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
|
||||
* (richard@levitte.org)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
|
||||
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
|
||||
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
|
||||
* Contributed to the OpenSSL Project 2004 by Richard Levitte
|
||||
* (richard@levitte.org)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
|
||||
/* Copyright (c) 2004 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
|
||||
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
|
||||
* All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user