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MFC: r296025:
pf: Fix possible out-of-bounds write In the DIOCRSETADDRS ioctl() handler we allocate a table for struct pfr_addrs, which is processed in pfr_set_addrs(). At the users request we also provide feedback on the deleted addresses, by storing them after the new list ('bcopy(&ad, addr + size + i, sizeof(ad));' in pfr_set_addrs()). This means we write outside the bounds of the buffer we've just allocated. We need to look at pfrio_size2 instead (i.e. the size the user reserved for our feedback). That'd allow a malicious user to specify a smaller pfrio_size2 than pfrio_size though, in which case we'd still read outside of the allocated buffer. Instead we allocate the largest of the two values. Reported By: Paul J Murphy <paul@inetstat.net> PR: 207463 Approved by: re (marius)
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Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/stable/10/; revision=296340
@ -2714,13 +2714,14 @@ DIOCCHANGEADDR_error:
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case DIOCRSETADDRS: {
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struct pfioc_table *io = (struct pfioc_table *)addr;
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struct pfr_addr *pfras;
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size_t totlen;
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size_t totlen, count;
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if (io->pfrio_esize != sizeof(struct pfr_addr)) {
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error = ENODEV;
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break;
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}
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totlen = io->pfrio_size * sizeof(struct pfr_addr);
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count = max(io->pfrio_size, io->pfrio_size2);
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totlen = count * sizeof(struct pfr_addr);
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pfras = malloc(totlen, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK);
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error = copyin(io->pfrio_buffer, pfras, totlen);
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if (error) {
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