Fix OpenSSL multiple vulnerabilities.

Security:	CVE-2014-0195, CVE-2014-0221, CVE-2014-0224,
		CVE-2014-3470
Security:	SA-14:14.openssl
Approved by:	so

crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c

@@ -627,7 +627,16 @@ dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 		frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
 		}
 	else
+		{
 		frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
+		if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
+			{
+			item = NULL;
+			frag = NULL;
+			goto err;
+			}
+		}
+
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
 	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
@@ -784,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 	int i,al;
 	struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
 
+	redo:
 	/* see if we have the required fragment already */
 	if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
 		{
@@ -842,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
 					s->msg_callback_arg);
 			
 			s->init_num = 0;
-			return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn,
-				max, ok);
+			goto redo;
 			}
 		else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
 			{

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c

@@ -559,6 +559,7 @@ int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
 
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -915,6 +916,7 @@ int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
+	    s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 	    s->hit=1;
 	    }
 	else	/* a miss or crap from the other end */
@@ -2510,6 +2512,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
 			int field_size = 0;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) 
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			/* Did we send out the client's
 			 * ECDH share for use in premaster
 			 * computation as part of client certificate?

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_pkt.c

@@ -1301,6 +1301,15 @@ start:
 			goto f_err;
 			}
 
+		if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
+			{
+			al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+			goto f_err;
+			}
+
+		s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
 		rr->length=0;
 
 		if (s->msg_callback)
@@ -1435,7 +1444,7 @@ int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
 
 	if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
 		{
-		if (s->session == NULL) 
+		if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
 			{
 			/* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);

crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_srvr.c

@@ -673,6 +673,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
 
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			/* we should decide if we expected this one */
 			ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -700,6 +701,7 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
 		case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
+			s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 			ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
 				SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
 			if (ret <= 0) goto end;
@@ -770,7 +772,10 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #else
 				if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+					{
+					s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+					}
 				else
 					s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
 #endif

crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl3.h

@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
  * effected, but we can't prevent that.
  */
 #define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE		0x0040
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK			0x0080
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN