Olivier Certner 9dad3ed1d1 cr_canseejailproc(): New privilege, no direct check for UID 0 ... Use priv_check_cred() with a new privilege (PRIV_SEEJAILPROC) instead of explicitly testing for UID 0 (the former has been the rule for almost 20 years). As a consequence, cr_canseejailproc() now abides by the 'security.bsd.suser_enabled' sysctl and MAC policies. Update the MAC policies Biba and LOMAC, and prison_priv_check() so that they don't deny this privilege. This preserves the existing behavior (the 'root' user is not restricted, even when jailed, unless 'security.bsd.suser_enabled' is not 0) and is consistent with what is done for the related policies/privileges (PRIV_SEEOTHERGIDS, PRIV_SEEOTHERUIDS). Reviewed by: emaste (earlier version), mhorne MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: Kumacom SAS Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D40626 (cherry picked from commit 7974ca1cdb)		2023-10-17 16:42:58 -03:00
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mac_biba.c	cr_canseejailproc(): New privilege, no direct check for UID 0	2023-10-17 16:42:58 -03:00
mac_biba.h	sys: Remove $FreeBSD$: two-line .h pattern	2023-08-16 11:54:11 -06:00