const std = @import("std"); const mem = std.mem; const maxInt = std.math.maxInt; const OutputTooLongError = std.crypto.errors.OutputTooLongError; const WeakParametersError = std.crypto.errors.WeakParametersError; // RFC 2898 Section 5.2 // // FromSpec: // // PBKDF2 applies a pseudorandom function (see Appendix B.1 for an // example) to derive keys. The length of the derived key is essentially // unbounded. (However, the maximum effective search space for the // derived key may be limited by the structure of the underlying // pseudorandom function. See Appendix B.1 for further discussion.) // PBKDF2 is recommended for new applications. // // PBKDF2 (P, S, c, dk_len) // // Options: PRF underlying pseudorandom function (h_len // denotes the length in octets of the // pseudorandom function output) // // Input: P password, an octet string // S salt, an octet string // c iteration count, a positive integer // dk_len intended length in octets of the derived // key, a positive integer, at most // (2^32 - 1) * h_len // // Output: DK derived key, a dk_len-octet string // Based on Apple's CommonKeyDerivation, based originally on code by Damien Bergamini. /// Apply PBKDF2 to generate a key from a password. /// /// PBKDF2 is defined in RFC 2898, and is a recommendation of NIST SP 800-132. /// /// dk: Slice of appropriate size for generated key. Generally 16 or 32 bytes in length. /// May be uninitialized. All bytes will be overwritten. /// Maximum size is `maxInt(u32) * Hash.digest_length` /// It is a programming error to pass buffer longer than the maximum size. /// /// password: Arbitrary sequence of bytes of any length, including empty. /// /// salt: Arbitrary sequence of bytes of any length, including empty. A common length is 8 bytes. /// /// rounds: Iteration count. Must be greater than 0. Common values range from 1,000 to 100,000. /// Larger iteration counts improve security by increasing the time required to compute /// the dk. It is common to tune this parameter to achieve approximately 100ms. /// /// Prf: Pseudo-random function to use. A common choice is `std.crypto.auth.hmac.sha2.HmacSha256`. pub fn pbkdf2(dk: []u8, password: []const u8, salt: []const u8, rounds: u32, comptime Prf: type) (WeakParametersError || OutputTooLongError)!void { if (rounds < 1) return error.WeakParameters; const dk_len = dk.len; const h_len = Prf.mac_length; comptime std.debug.assert(h_len >= 1); // FromSpec: // // 1. If dk_len > maxInt(u32) * h_len, output "derived key too long" and // stop. // if (dk_len / h_len >= maxInt(u32)) { // Counter starts at 1 and is 32 bit, so if we have to return more blocks, we would overflow return error.OutputTooLong; } // FromSpec: // // 2. Let l be the number of h_len-long blocks of bytes in the derived key, // rounding up, and let r be the number of bytes in the last // block // const blocks_count = @as(u32, @intCast(std.math.divCeil(usize, dk_len, h_len) catch unreachable)); var r = dk_len % h_len; if (r == 0) { r = h_len; } // FromSpec: // // 3. For each block of the derived key apply the function F defined // below to the password P, the salt S, the iteration count c, and // the block index to compute the block: // // T_1 = F (P, S, c, 1) , // T_2 = F (P, S, c, 2) , // ... // T_l = F (P, S, c, l) , // // where the function F is defined as the exclusive-or sum of the // first c iterates of the underlying pseudorandom function PRF // applied to the password P and the concatenation of the salt S // and the block index i: // // F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c // // where // // U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) , // U_2 = PRF (P, U_1) , // ... // U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) . // // Here, INT (i) is a four-octet encoding of the integer i, most // significant octet first. // // 4. Concatenate the blocks and extract the first dk_len octets to // produce a derived key DK: // // DK = T_1 || T_2 || ... || T_l<0..r-1> var block: u32 = 0; while (block < blocks_count) : (block += 1) { var prev_block: [h_len]u8 = undefined; var new_block: [h_len]u8 = undefined; // U_1 = PRF (P, S || INT (i)) const block_index = mem.toBytes(mem.nativeToBig(u32, block + 1)); // Block index starts at 0001 var ctx = Prf.init(password); ctx.update(salt); ctx.update(block_index[0..]); ctx.final(prev_block[0..]); // Choose portion of DK to write into (T_n) and initialize const offset = block * h_len; const block_len = if (block != blocks_count - 1) h_len else r; const dk_block: []u8 = dk[offset..][0..block_len]; @memcpy(dk_block, prev_block[0..dk_block.len]); var i: u32 = 1; while (i < rounds) : (i += 1) { // U_c = PRF (P, U_{c-1}) Prf.create(&new_block, prev_block[0..], password); prev_block = new_block; // F (P, S, c, i) = U_1 \xor U_2 \xor ... \xor U_c for (dk_block, 0..) |_, j| { dk_block[j] ^= new_block[j]; } } } } const htest = @import("test.zig"); const HmacSha1 = std.crypto.auth.hmac.HmacSha1; // RFC 6070 PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 Test Vectors test "RFC 6070 one iteration" { const p = "password"; const s = "salt"; const c = 1; const dk_len = 20; var dk: [dk_len]u8 = undefined; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "0c60c80f961f0e71f3a9b524af6012062fe037a6"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "RFC 6070 two iterations" { const p = "password"; const s = "salt"; const c = 2; const dk_len = 20; var dk: [dk_len]u8 = undefined; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "ea6c014dc72d6f8ccd1ed92ace1d41f0d8de8957"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "RFC 6070 4096 iterations" { const p = "password"; const s = "salt"; const c = 4096; const dk_len = 20; var dk: [dk_len]u8 = undefined; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "4b007901b765489abead49d926f721d065a429c1"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "RFC 6070 16,777,216 iterations" { // These iteration tests are slow so we always skip them. Results have been verified. if (true) { return error.SkipZigTest; } const p = "password"; const s = "salt"; const c = 16777216; const dk_len = 20; var dk = [_]u8{0} ** dk_len; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "eefe3d61cd4da4e4e9945b3d6ba2158c2634e984"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "RFC 6070 multi-block salt and password" { const p = "passwordPASSWORDpassword"; const s = "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt"; const c = 4096; const dk_len = 25; var dk: [dk_len]u8 = undefined; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "3d2eec4fe41c849b80c8d83662c0e44a8b291a964cf2f07038"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "RFC 6070 embedded NUL" { const p = "pass\x00word"; const s = "sa\x00lt"; const c = 4096; const dk_len = 16; var dk: [dk_len]u8 = undefined; try pbkdf2(&dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); const expected = "56fa6aa75548099dcc37d7f03425e0c3"; try htest.assertEqual(expected, dk[0..]); } test "Very large dk_len" { // This test allocates 8GB of memory and is expected to take several hours to run. if (true) { return error.SkipZigTest; } const p = "password"; const s = "salt"; const c = 1; const dk_len = 1 << 33; const dk = try std.testing.allocator.alloc(u8, dk_len); defer std.testing.allocator.free(dk); // Just verify this doesn't crash with an overflow try pbkdf2(dk, p, s, c, HmacSha1); }